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The Implausibility of Secrecy 
Mark Fenster 
Government secrecy frequently fails. Despite the executive branch’s obsessive hoarding of 
certain kinds of documents and its constitutional authority to do so, recent high-profile 
events—among them the WikiLeaks episode, the Obama administration’s infamous leak 
prosecutions, and the widespread disclosure by high-level officials of flattering 
confidential information to sympathetic reporters—undercut the image of a state that can 
classify and control its information. The effort to control government information 
requires human, bureaucratic, technological, and textual mechanisms that regularly 
founder or collapse in an administrative state, sometimes immediately and sometimes 
after an interval. Leaks, mistakes, and open sources all constitute paths out of the 
government’s informational clutches. As a result, permanent, long-lasting secrecy of any 
sort and to any degree is costly and difficult to accomplish. 
 
This Article argues that information control is an implausible goal. It critiques some of 
the foundational assumptions of constitutional and statutory laws that seek to regulate 
information flows, while complicating and countering the extensive literature on secrecy, 
transparency, and leaks that rest on those assumptions. By focusing on the functional issues 
relating to government information and broadening its study beyond the much-examined 
phenomenon of leaks, the Article catalogs and then illustrates the formal and informal 
means by which information flows out of the state in a series of case studies. These 
informal means play an especially important role in limiting both the ability of state actors 
to keep secrets and the extent to which formal legal doctrines can control the flow of 
government information. The same bureaucracy and legal regime that keep open 
government laws from creating a transparent state also keep the executive branch from 
creating a perfect informational dam. The Article draws several implications from this 
descriptive, functional argument for legal reform and for the study of administrative and 
constitutional law. 
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Florida. Many thanks to Nick Cullather, David Pozen, Rachel Rebouché, and Gary Ross for their 
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The federal government keeps an enormous number of secrets—far 
too many, according to transparency advocates,1 the press,2 government 
 
 1. See, e.g., Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 Yale L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 399, 401–07 (2009) (a criticism of expansion of classification system by a leading open 
government activist); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing 
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 131, 133–34 (2006) (noting the excessive expansion of the 
classification system after the 9/11 attacks). 
 2. See, e.g., Editorial, The Dangerous Comfort of Secrecy, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2005, at A20 
(complaining that “the government’s addiction to secrecy is making an unnecessary casualty of the 
openness vital to democracy”). 
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commissions,3 and courts.4 The volume of classified records rises endlessly, 
as does the cost of keeping them, resulting in an enormous secrecy 
program that regulates the flow of information in the executive branch.5 
And yet, the executive branch’s efforts to keep secrets frequently fail, as a 
series of worried government commissions have concluded over the past 
several decades.6 The WikiLeaks episode constitutes the most spectacular 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information,7 while the Obama 
administration’s ongoing prosecution of leaks stands as an effort to 
correct an apparently pervasive and perhaps unfixable problem.8 At the 
same time, high-ranking officials regularly leak and plant classified 
information for political gain, often with explicit or implicit authorization.9 
 
 3. See, e.g., Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 
S. Doc. No. 105-2 (1997) (noting the problem and the history of its study); The 9/11 Commission 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
417 (2004) (“Current security requirements nurture over-classification and excessive 
compartmentation of information among agencies.”); Def. Dep’t Comm. on Classified Info., Report 
to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Classified Information 2–6 (1956) (noting the 
problems created by over-classification). 
 4. See, e.g., ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (identifying the 
“unfortunate tendency of government officials to over-classify information”). 
 5. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., Deputy Inspector Gen. for Intelligence & Special Program Assessments, Report 
on Sensitive Compartmented Information Leaks in the Department of Defense, Rep. No. 2012-056 
(2012) (confirming unauthorized disclosures of classified national intelligence from Department of 
Defense between December 2008 and December 2011); Comm’n on the Intelligence Capabilities of 
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the 
United States 381–84 (2005) (summarizing classified version of report and previous government 
studies that have identified noting “[h]undreds of serious press leaks” and calling for more aggressive 
and coordinated investigation of leaks). 
 7. See generally Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National 
Security Disclosures, 121 Yale L.J. 1448 (2012); Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks 
and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 311 (2011); 
Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 753 (2012). 
 8. Shane Harris, Plugging the Leaks, Washingtonian (July 21, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/plugging-the-leaks; Adam Liptak, A High-Tech War on 
Leaks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR5. 
 9. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. 
Times, June 1, 2012, at A1 (reporting on classified program, based in part on internal administration 
sources); Austin Wright, John McCain Demands Leak Investigation, Politico (June 5, 2012, 7:32 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77089.html (legislators criticizing the Obama 
administration’s self-leaking). For a further discussion on the disjunction between the Obama 
administration’s practice of both leaking and decrying leaks, see Jack Goldsmith, President Obama’s 
Non-Credible Statement on Leaks, Lawfare (June 8, 2012, 4:18 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
2012/06/president-obamas-non-credible-statement-on-leaks. Notably, the George W. Bush 
administration engaged in the same seemingly contradictory practice. See Robert Pear, Politics Can 
Get in the Way of Keeping Papers Secret, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2004, at A9 (detailing incidents when 
the Bush administration allowed “political imperatives [to] force officials to set aside the government’s 
normal procedures for classifying and declassifying national security information”). Members of 
Congress, especially those opposed to the President, regularly complain of such leaks. See, e.g., Steven 
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The New York Times’ 2005 disclosure of the National Security Agency’s 
(the “NSA”) warrantless surveillance of domestic communication appears 
to support both contradictory claims—that the government both retains 
and loses too many secrets: the George W. Bush administration engaged in 
extraordinary, seemingly successful efforts to maintain the program’s 
secrecy—efforts that ultimately failed when the program’s outlines leaked 
to the press.10 
Some commentators have resolved the conflict between these two 
competing claims by hypothesizing that excessive secrecy causes 
inadvertent leaks—that the government loses classified information 
precisely because it classifies too much.11 Marginal increases in secrecy 
are nothing new, however. Indeed, the complaint that the state hoards 
too much information has a long history in the United States12 and in 
critiques of bureaucratic secrecy.13 The United States has also regularly 
 
Aftergood, McCain Calls for Special Counsel to Investigate Leaks, Secrecy News (June 6, 2012), 
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/06/mccain_leaks.html. 
 10. The program remained secret to the public for three years, from its inception in 2002 until its 
disclosure in the New York Times in 2005, a year after the newspaper had first learned of it. See Eric 
Lichtblau, Bush’s Law 194–99 (2008); James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA 
and the Bush Administration 44–60 (2006); Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 77, 145–47 (2010); see also Alasdair Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the 
Information Age 72–78, 232–33 (2006) (describing the unraveling of the Bush administration’s efforts to 
control information about the invasion of Iraq and of detainee abuses in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay). 
 11. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 7, at 1518–19 (listing over-classification, along with digital 
technology and the quantity of classified documents and individuals with access to it, as “interrelated 
factors [that] shape the environment for leaks”); Fuchs, supra note 1, at 139 (arguing that over-
classification and excessive secrecy “undermine the effort to keep truly sensitive information secret”); 
Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 881, 889 (“[T]he 
potential for leaks grows with the number of official secrets and official secret-keepers.”). This 
complaint is also time-honored. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system 
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on 
self-protection or self-promotion.”). 
 12. The fact that unauthorized leaks constitute a grievous problem has been as widely 
acknowledged, as has the fact that the government over-classifies the information it wants to control. 
For a list of the ten government reports issued between 1956 and 2004 that have addressed and 
condemned the problem of secrecy and government leaks, see Gary Ross, Who Watches the 
Watchmen? The Conflict Between National Security and Freedom of the Press 17–20 (2011). 
 13. For at least the past century, scholars have understood that secrecy in organizations, including 
government entities, is an inevitable product of the bureaucratic attempt to control information flows. 
See, e.g., Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 5–6 (1983) (defining 
secrecy as the intentional concealment of information); Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel 
345 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., 1950) (noting how organizations that control secret information use 
secrecy to “determine[] the reciprocal relations among those who share it in common”); Max Weber, 
Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 992 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich 
eds., 1968) (“Bureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and 
action from criticism as well as it can.”); Richard W. Wilsnack, Information Control: A Conceptual 
Framework for Sociological Analysis, 8 Urb. Life 467 (1980) (attempting to develop a conceptual field for 
the study of how organizations maintain control over access to information). 
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lost information since its founding.14 A less secret government might lose 
proportionally fewer secrets, but it could not stop all secrets from 
escaping its control. To be sure, the state can protect some information, 
especially “deep secrets”—the “unknown unknowns”15 which the public 
does not know exist because they circulate within strict limits and benefit 
from exceptional technological and logistical efforts to confine them.16 
Notwithstanding the state’s enormous precautions, many of its deepest 
secrets ultimately come to light anyway. As with the NSA’s surveillance 
program,17 the effort to keep deep secrets can delay disclosure, but it 
often cannot prevent it entirely.18 
These secrecy failures occur because of the state’s bureaucratic 
structure and the difficulties of both storing and communicating 
information. The state must depend for its internal decisionmaking 
process on the flow of information from sources dispersed within and 
outside government.19 Like all large organizations engaged in complex 
tasks, the administrative state neither circulates nor processes information 
internally in a mechanical, coordinated, fully rational way.20 There is no 
reason to think, therefore, that an organization which cannot perfectly 
control or manage its internal flow of information can stop information 
at the borders of its bureaucracy.21 Put simply, the effort to control state 
information requires human, organizational, technological, and textual 
mechanisms that often fail in the checks and balances of a democratic 
state, sometimes by design and sometimes by the weakness of 
bureaucratic control. Secrecy of any sort and to any degree is costly and 
 
 14. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 12, at 9–11; Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in 
Governance and the Law of Journalists’ Confidentiality, 1795–2005, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 425, 432–41 (2006). 
 15. This phrase is commonly associated with former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who 
used it to refer to information about Iraq’s effort to develop weapons of mass destruction. Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, (Feb. 12, 
2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636. 
 16. See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (2010). 
 17. See supra note 10. 
 18. Pozen, supra note 16, at 327–31 (discussing “deep secrets” that later came to light). 
 19. See Cass Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 
126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838, 1839. 1842–43 (2013) (noting the crucial role that the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (the “OIRA”) plays for the President and White House by acquiring 
information and knowledge that are dispersed within and outside of the administrative state). 
 20. Authoritative descriptions of this organizational phenomenon appear in James G. March, 
Decisions and Organizations 385–403, 410–25 (1988), Harold Seidman & Robert Gilmour, 
Politics, Position, and Power 219 (4th ed. 1986), and Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of 
Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. Econ. 99 (1955). For an insightful explanation of the relationship between 
information and foreign policy development that explains the imperfect means by which 
administrations and presidents manage the internal flow of information, see Morton H. Halperin et 
al., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy 139–80 (2d ed. 2006). 
 21. See Halperin et al., supra note 20, at 181–203 (describing the means by which information 
flows out of the state, and the various motivations of those who allow it to do so). 
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difficult to accomplish and can only stem the authorized flow of official 
information.22 
This is not, however, how the vast majority of reformers, activists, 
and academics understand the issue. Transparency proponents view 
secrecy as an inefficient and harmful bureaucratic practice whose 
overregulation of information flows demands correction.23 It is a 
correctable bug in the system, one that the right mix of legal and 
institutional reforms can fix by allowing information to flow to the 
public.24 Secrecy’s proponents view the issue from an opposite, though 
parallel, position. Their concern for national security, foreign relations, 
and law enforcement—and for allowing an autonomous, unitary 
executive to protect the flow of information—leads them to view secrecy 
as a crucial administrative goal.25 Like transparency proponents, secrecy 
proponents frame their dissatisfaction as a solvable legal problem: if we 
design laws and institutions to protect the executive’s privilege to control 
information, then we can re-establish a correct balance between 
transparency and secrecy.26 The bug in governance that secrecy advocates 
trust law to correct is excessive disclosure, not the excessive protection of 
information. 
But perfect information control of whatever sort is in fact an 
implausible goal.27 The laws and legal norms that ensure limited, 
 
 22. This Article considers only government secrecy in the United States and makes no claims 
about the portability of its conclusions to other nations and especially to other political systems. It 
should be noted, however, that information still flows even in autocratic and secretive regimes: it just 
does so more, and often much more, through rumors, gossip, and figurative forms (like the arts) than 
through a private press or formal civil society institutions. This was particularly the case in the Soviet 
Union, for example. See Geoffrey Hosking, Rulers And Victims: The Russians in the Soviet 
Union 51 (2006); Raymond A. Bauer & David B. Gleicher, Word-of-Mouth Communication in the 
Soviet Union, 17 Pub. Opinion Q. 297, 298–300 (1953); Thomas Remington, The Mass Media and 
Public Communication in the USSR, 43 J. Pol. 803, 803–05 (1981). 
 23. See, e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience 59 (1998) 
(characterizing secrecy as a correctable form of regulation). 
 24. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U. L. Q. 1, 
15–17 (1976) (arguing for “right to know” with broad standing component for public to seek judicial 
enforcement); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909 (2006) (arguing for the development of “platforms” of 
constitutional concepts enabling more rigorous judicial review of information access issues). See 
generally Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the 
Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 443 (2012) (chronicling the history of open government 
advocacy and its focus on legal solutions to government secrecy). 
 25. See Gabriel Schoenfeld, Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule 
of Law (2010); Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 Ala. L. 
Rev. 811, 818–21 (2007). 
 26. A preeminent proponent of this position is former Vice President Dick Cheney. See infra 
Part IV.B. 
 27. To be clear, this is not an argument that “information wants to be free.” See generally John 
Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age, 
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imperfect secrecy and transparency do not lend themselves easily to legal 
reform; rather than bugs in the system of governance, they are part of its 
operating code. Like the open government laws that cannot always force 
the flow of information from a sprawling, stubborn bureaucracy,28 laws 
that authorize the government to keep secrets cannot construct a perfect 
informational dam against the leaks caused by that same bureaucracy. 
Information can flow as a result of formal legal requirements; it can leak 
out from sources within government; it can be found in open sources 
besides the state; and it can become visible due to official mistake. 
Furthermore, secrecy engenders public speculation about what is being 
withheld, while the process of keeping secrets, once made public, itself 
communicates important information about the state and its governance 
strategy. Under-enforced and often unenforceable laws and regulations, 
bureaucratic inertia and resistance, and the push and pull of an advanced 
democracy with vibrant civil institutions render both transparency and 
secrecy implausible. 
This Article critiques some of the foundational assumptions of 
constitutional and statutory laws that seek to regulate information flows, 
while complicating and countering the extensive literature on secrecy 
and leaks that rest on those assumptions. Unlike most articles in this 
area, my concerns are not normative: this Article will not argue in favor 
of transparency or against secrecy, principles that are typically espoused 
in persuasive rhetoric that finds deep secrecy morally repugnant to a 
democratic state.29 Nor will it argue that efforts to control information 
are benign or have no ill effect. They can, for example, delay disclosure 
even when they cannot prevent it permanently. Instead, this Article 
focuses on why the control of government information that secrecy 
proponents and critics assume is possible cannot in fact be achieved on a 
regular and programmatic basis. Outlining the limits to information 
control and discussing several instances of notable control failures in 
detail, this Article contends that secrecy is in fact implausible. 
My purpose is to better understand what information control can 
and cannot accomplish, and what effects it actually has—and, as a 
consequence, both the powers and limits of the executive’s ability to 
govern in a unitary and coordinated fashion. The issue requires a broad 
 
Wired, Mar. 1994 (establishing that phrase, and its libertarian implications, in the technophilic 
lexicon). Information neither wants to be free nor wants to be controlled. It is a thing; it cannot want. 
Rather, information circulates in a social environment that makes it difficult to control. 
 28. Cf. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 885, 914–15 (2006) 
[hereinafter Fenster, Opacity] (critiquing assumptions embedded in the concept of “transparency”). 
 29. This is particularly true in the field of constitutional law. For recent arguments against deep 
secrecy’s constitutionality, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege 
Revisited, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 489, 522–27 (2006); Pozen, supra note 16, at 305–23. 
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consideration of the legal, administrative, and social means by which the 
state both controls and loses control of information, as well as the ethical 
and political checks on that control. To that end, Part I of this Article 
identifies the laws and bureaucratic norms that allow and encourage 
secrecy, and notes the important but incomplete formal legal limits on 
secrecy. Part II outlines the various informal impediments—
bureaucratic, political, and technological—to the state’s ability to control 
information. 
Understanding this phenomenon also requires a grasp of the very 
different ways that the state can lose control of information. Through 
case studies,30 Parts III through V present illustrative secrecy failures in 
instances when the state has tried it’s hardest to keep secrets. Part III 
chronicles the effort by the George W. Bush administration to keep secret 
Vice President Dick Cheney’s National Energy Policy Development 
Group (“NEPDG”), a key pre-9/11 episode that foreshadowed later 
struggles over executive branch secrecy. Its significance is more than as a 
mere prelude to the broader efforts to control information that followed. 
The Vice President’s efforts to keep NEPDG’s actions secret relied upon 
the most well-articulated theory of executive control over information, 
which Cheney had helped develop in writings that he had overseen and 
published. Notwithstanding this explicit attempt to deploy the theory of 
perfect information control in practice, the myriad legal and extralegal 
ways by which NEPDG information escaped the Vice President’s control 
illustrate secrecy’s limits and implausibility. Part IV describes the 
attempted redaction of classified information as a general type of secrecy 
failure that has occurred in several recent instances. Part V discusses the 
difficulty that the government faces in controlling even its most prized 
secrets about covert operations, focusing on one of the most significant 
such operations in twentieth century United States history: the CIA-led 
coup in Guatemala in 1954, which deposed that country’s popularly 
elected president. 
The Conclusion draws three implications from secrecy’s 
implausibility: first, that law has limited effects on secrecy’s possible 
success, leaving politics and ethics as levers that play crucial roles in 
limiting and imposing secrecy; second, that we would be better served to 
 
 30. This Article’s argument asserts that legal and bureaucratic systems of control fail and that 
information can and will escape in a myriad of ways—even in those cases in which the government 
tries hardest to protect its secrets. To prove and illustrate this argument, the case study method’s 
sensitivity to historical specificity and contingency outweighs its limitations in scale and the danger 
that each case is anomalous. This Article’s three different sets of case studies—which concern varied 
methods by which the state has sought to control information about domestic policy development, 
intelligence operations, and covert action—demonstrate the argument’s application across a variety of 
state actions. 
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re-conceptualize the availability of information in terms other than as a 
binary between secrecy and disclosure; and third, because secrecy proves 
increasingly implausible in the long run, reform efforts should focus on 
express pre-commitments to the timely, if delayed, systematic release of 
the executive branch’s most prized information. 
 
I.  Secrecy’s Laws and Norms 
The contemporary state keeps secrets—an enormous quantity of 
them, in fact. In the United States, government over-classification of 
information is excessive secrecy’s most obvious and outrageous 
manifestation. As a regulatory regime developed to protect Cold War 
secrets, information classification has mushroomed to a multi-billion 
dollar regulatory program—$11.36 billion in fiscal year 2011, a figure that 
has steadily risen since 1995 and that does not include the enormous 
costs borne by the major intelligence agencies, whose budgets are 
themselves classified.31 Thousands of officials with delegated authority 
classify and then seek to protect documents as secret; hundreds of 
thousands of documents are classified annually; tens of millions of 
government documents incorporate classified information and in the 
process become part of a universe characterized as “derivative 
classification.”32 The state’s ability to control information to this extent 
depends not only upon the formal legal doctrines that allow the executive 
branch to protect secrets, but also the informal institutional norms that 
impose professional and social obligations on executive branch officers to 
respect and uphold an agency’s secrecy regime. 
A. Secrecy Law 
Both explicitly and implicitly, law enables—and even encourages— 
executive branch secrecy. The Constitution’s construction of separate 
powers provides the most significant, as well as the most abstract, source 
of legal authority for the executive’s protection of information. The 
Supreme Court has found that Article II confers on the President the 
power to classify and control information regarding national security and 
foreign policy, especially where Congress has not provided otherwise.33 
Congress can only limit presidential control over executive branch 
information if it does not prevent the President from accomplishing his 
 
 31. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, 2011 Cost Report 2–3 (2012). 
 32. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, 2011 Report to the 
President 1–9 (2012). 
 33. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 530 (1988); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 
(1981). 
Fenster_21 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:39 PM 
318 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:309 
 
“constitutionally assigned functions.”34 Congress can, for example, require 
executive branch agencies to respond to private individuals’ informational 
requests and can delegate to the federal courts the authority to resolve 
disputes between agencies and requesters, but only so long as the 
documents demanded do not impinge on the President’s privilege to 
withhold certain types of information.35 
This protection from interbranch intrusion provides the President 
and executive branch with the privilege to hold certain secrets from 
Congress and against Congress’s wishes.36 The privilege’s abstract and 
highly contested contours appear in a cluster of related doctrines, some 
of which fall within the formal doctrine of “executive privilege.” The 
D.C. Circuit has distinguished three separate privileges that compose the 
doctrine: (1) a classic but somewhat narrow, absolute privilege to 
withhold information “crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and 
responsibilities of the executive branch of our government;” (2) a 
broader privilege to withhold “presidential communications” among the 
President and his closest advisors, which is subject to a deferential 
judicial balancing test; and (3) a qualified “deliberative process privilege” 
protecting information from the process of government decision-
making.37 The concept of privilege extends to include the “state secrets” 
doctrine, which allows the Department of Justice to bar plaintiffs from 
access to national security information in tort litigation filed against the 
military or other government agencies.38 And the executive branch can 
broadly protect its deliberative process by designing or using groups to 
seek advice in performing its constitutional duties without disclosing 
information produced by and for them, notwithstanding legislation that 
seeks to impose openness mandates on advisory committees.39 Viewed 
broadly, “privilege” serves as a legal concept that refers to the executive’s 
authority to control information; viewed in its strongest form, as the 
 
 34. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (upholding the Presidential 
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act against constitutional challenge for violating the 
separation of powers). 
 35. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973). 
 36. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974) (recognizing the executive’s 
“supremacy . . . within its own assigned area of constitutional duties”). 
 37. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 736–40 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 38. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–10 (1953) (establishing the state-secrets doctrine). 
See generally Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1249, 1270–1308 (2007) (surveying executive branch’s use of doctrine). 
 39. Public Citizen v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 442, 466–67 (1989) (interpreting the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (the “FACA”) narrowly to avoid the “formidable constitutional difficulties” 
that would arise if it were applied to the President’s use of the American Bar Association’s Standing 
Committee to receive advice on Supreme Court nominations). See generally infra Part III.B 
(summarizing and analyzing underlying separation of powers issues in dispute over FACA’s 
application). 
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George W. Bush administration advocated more forcefully than its recent 
predecessors,40 the Constitution’s textual commitment of the “Executive 
Power,” among other authorities, grants the President a “zone of 
autonomy” from congressional intrusion.41 
Beyond specific doctrines, the privilege concept affects the 
institutional relationship between the executive and judiciary. Courts defer 
to executive branch claims or avoid potential constitutional conflicts with 
the executive branch by construing statutes narrowly.42 In Nixon v. United 
States (which rejected the President’s effort to use the deliberative 
privilege to withhold White House tapes from the special prosecutor 
investigating Watergate), the Supreme Court used sweeping language to 
recognize the President’s authority to shield privileged information in 
certain circumstances.43 Nixon can thus be read in two ways, both of 
which enable secrecy as a matter of law or practice. Nixon represents 
either, as William Van Alstyne characterized it, “an oblique invitation to 
the President to throttle judicial review by presenting a claim of 
executive privilege in the cellophane wrapper of ‘national security,’”44 or 
it more expressly invites endless political struggles over information 
between the executive and legislature.45 Political struggle, which has 
proven the most frequent means to resolve executive privilege disputes 
over information,46 will favor the political branch that holds the 
information, giving a great advantage to the executive. If the executive 
privilege claim is colorable, and if courts slowly and only occasionally 
resolve disputed instances of its use, a presidential administration can use 
 
 40. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A 
Constitutional History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 1094–97 (2008). But see Mark J. Rozell, The Clinton 
Legacy: An Old (or New) Understanding of Executive Privilege?, in The Presidency and the Law: 
The Clinton Legacy 58, 70 (David Gray Adler & Michael A. Genovese eds., 2002) (arguing that 
President Clinton’s misuse of executive privilege gave the doctrine a “bad name”). 
 41. Brief for Petitioners at 34, Cheney v. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No. 03-475) (citing 
U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 2, cl. 1, 3, cl. 1); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The 
Unitary Executive 407 (2008) (identifying the government’s argument in its brief in Cheney as a key 
example of how the Bush administration “staunchly protected the autonomy of the executive branch 
in the courts”). This Article discusses the Court’s decision in this case, and the circumstances 
surrounding the litigation, in Part III, infra. 
 42. Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 501–02. 
 43. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–07 (1974) (holding that deliberative privilege loses 
in a balance against the need for information in a criminal prosecution, while recognizing a broad 
privilege “to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets”). 
 44. William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 
22 UCLA L. Rev. 116, 123 (1974). 
 45. Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to National Security Information, 45 Harv. J. on Legis. 
219, 219–20 (2008); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush 
Presidency, 52 Duke L.J. 403, 404 (2002). 
 46. Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive Access Disputes: Legal Standards and Political 
Settlements, 9 J.L. & Pol. 719, 735 (1993). 
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the doctrine to keep secrets, at least temporarily. Between the President’s 
occasional successes in the courts, the costs required to challenge exercises 
of executive authority, and the delays caused by a President’s resistance to 
disclosure, executive privilege grants the President the practical and legal 
ability to control information.47 
Non-constitutional authorities parallel and extend the constitutional 
privilege. In its open government legislation, Congress typically respects 
the President’s authority by protecting certain kinds of documents48 and 
certain types of government entities49 and advisors50 from disclosure 
mandates. The classification system, largely developed and overseen by 
the executive branch itself, enables agencies with classification authority 
to keep information secret almost indefinitely and without interbranch 
oversight.51 The Freedom of Information Act (the “FOIA”) explicitly 
excludes classified documents from disclosure,52 while the Espionage Act 
criminalizes the knowing and intentional unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information.53 The Whistleblower Protection Act specifically 
excludes from its protection personnel in the intelligence community,54 
more generally excludes civil servant positions of a “confidential, policy-
determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character,”55 and grants 
the President authority to exempt any positions when the President finds 
it “necessary and warranted by conditions of good administration.”56 It 
explicitly precludes from protection disclosures of information 
“specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically 
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national 
defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.”57 The Intelligence Community 
 
 47. Louis Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege 257–59 (2004). 
 48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2006) (exempting certain documents from disclosure under the 
Freedom of Information Act (the “FOIA”)). 
 49. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (holding 
that FOIA does not apply to close presidential advisors); 50 U.S.C. § 3507 (2013) (exempting the 
Central Intelligence Agency (the “CIA”) from any law requiring “disclosure of the organization, 
functions, names official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency”). 
 50. Public Citizen v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 462–65 (1989) (interpreting FACA narrowly 
to restrain its reach from purely private groups “not formed at the behest of the Executive or by quasi-
public organizations whose opinions the Federal Government sometimes solicits”). 
 51. Executive Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298, § 1.2(a)(1)–(3) (2009) (authorizing the 
classification system by means of Obama administration’s executive order). In dicta, the Supreme 
Court has found classification authority in the Constitution’s Commander in Chief Clause. Dep’t of 
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1988). 
 52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
 53. See 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e) (2006); see also infra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
 54. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). 
 55. Id. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 56. Id. § 2303(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 57. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After 
Garcetti, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1531, 1537 (2008); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1)(B). 
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Whistleblower Protection Act (the “ICWPA”) covers intelligence 
community employees and identifies appropriate mechanisms for 
reporting items of concern (fraud, waste, abuse, illegal activity) in an 
appropriate manner, but notably does not include disclosures to the 
media.58 Congress has thereby created or permitted the creation of laws 
and executive branch authorities that sanction the regular production 
and protection of secrets. 
B. Secrecy Norms 
No presidential administration welcomes unauthorized leaks, and 
most—including the alleged “hermetic seal”59 of the administration of 
George W. Bush—attempt to threaten those officials who leak without 
authorization with criminal punishment. But threats of criminal sanction 
are only one means of stopping leaks. Bureaucratic structures and 
practices also establish norms of official behavior that create and protect 
secrets. Organizational control of information works to define the 
organization’s boundaries: those inside enjoy access to the shared, 
exclusive knowledge that members possess; those outside are excluded 
from the organization’s secrets.60 Secrecy thereby produces a paradox; it 
commands an organization’s members both to practice control and 
silence around outsiders and demands that they share, discuss, and 
obsess over information among those within the organization.61 A secrecy 
regime thus requires collective self-discipline built from a strong sense of 
privileged exclusion.62 Formal legal protections for the maintenance of 
secrecy must rely heavily on such informal organizational means that 
government entities use both to protect and to communicate secrets. 
These informal means can prove quite powerful. Daniel Ellsberg, 
who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press, characterizes such norms 
as the “psychosocial aspects” of organizational membership. By building 
self- and professional identity around membership, an organization that 
holds secrets threatens to exclude those who break their promise not to 
share information with outsiders.63 Informing outside authorities about 
an organization’s secrets thus breaches an individual member’s loyalty to 
 
 58. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 701, 112 Stat. 
2396 (1998) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8H) (containing the ICWPA); id. § 702 (containing an 
identical provision applicable to the CIA and codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403q(d)(5) (2013)). 
 59. Peter Baker, What’s Leaking Out of the White House?, Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/06/AR2007040601818.html. 
 60. Simmel, supra note 13, at 332; Gary Alan Fine & Lori Holyfield, Secrecy, Trust, and Dangerous 
Leisure: Generating Group Cohesion in Voluntary Organizations, 59 Soc. Psychol. Q. 22, 29–30 (1996). 
 61. Beryl L. Bellman, The Paradox of Secrecy, 4 Hum. Stud. 1, 8–9, 21 (1981). 
 62. T. M. Luhrmann, The Magic of Secrecy, 17 Ethos 131, 161–62 (1989). 
 63. Daniel Ellsberg, Secrecy and National Security Whistleblowing, 77 Soc. Res. 773, 777 (2010). 
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the organization and to the organization’s hierarchical authority.64 As a 
result of their actions, those who tell an organization’s secrets face 
significant costs to their career, including retaliatory suspension or 
termination from their jobs and the loss of informational privileges like 
security access that might be required for their profession.65 Whistleblowers 
and leakers can irrevocably shatter their professional and personal lives 
through their actions, facing exile from the community to which they had 
belonged,66 as well as their access to an exciting, exclusive world that 
enlivened the professional, bureaucratic mundanity of their work lives.67 
Organizational and professional membership pulls individuals into the 
world of secret information and binds them there, in the process shoring 
up the formal legal secrecy system by discouraging members from leaking 
information, and at times by encouraging them to destroy or keep hidden 
information from investigators.68 
C. Secrecy’s Legal and Institutional Limits 
Of course, legal and structural restraints on secrecy do exist, even in 
the face of executive branch resistance. Courts do not always shy away 
from constitutional clashes over information and do not always view the 
zone of constitutional privilege expansively.69 In the federal system, 
Congress has the authority and legal tools to oversee agencies, investigate 
the White House, and leverage its ability to punish agencies and 
individuals to lift the veil on executive branch secrecy.70 It does so through 
its oversight authority, committee structure, subpoena and impeachment 
 
 64. Bok, supra note 13, at 214–16. 
 65. Amanda C. Leiter, “Whistle . . . and You’ve Got an Audience”, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 747, 
757–58 (2008); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National 
Security Information, 83 Ind. L.J. 233, 248 (2008); Scott Shane, There Are Leaks. And Then There Are 
Leaks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2006, at A4 (providing examples of officials who have lost their jobs as a 
result of their leaking information). 
 66. C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power 119–21 
(2001); Myron Peretz Glazer & Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing 
Corruption in Government and Industry 133–66 (1989). 
 67. Luhrmann, supra note 62, at 141. 
 68. See, e.g., David A. Wallace, Implausible Deniability: The Politics of Documents in the Iran-
Contra Affair and Its Investigations, in Archives and the Public Good 91, 111–12 (Richard J. Cox & 
David A. Wallace eds., 2002) (describing how those involved in the Iran-Contra scandal blocked 
investigators from key documents). 
 69. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–13 (1974) (considering presidential privilege “in 
light of our historic commitment to the rule of law,” and holding that the President’s privilege claim 
did not outweigh the interest in “the fair administration of criminal justice”). 
 70. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 104–05 (2006); 
Mathew P. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. 
Econ. & Org. 243, 259–60 (1987). 
Fenster_21 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:39 PM 
February 2014]       THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF SECRECY 323 
 
powers,71 appropriation authority,72 and by using its legislative power to 
create public rights in executive branch information and to protect 
whistleblowers from retaliation.73 Courts, too, limit secrecy in a number 
of ways beyond high-profile constitutional disputes. They enforce 
statutory disclosure mandates,74 and they oversee the discovery process in 
criminal prosecution and in private tort suits against the government.75 
These formal limits on executive branch secrecy are famously 
imperfect. Congressional oversight, especially of national security matters, 
is fragmented among numerous committees that are variable in strength 
and focus, and it is frequently quite deferential.76 The institutional 
interbranch rivalry that should theoretically lead the legislature to probe 
executive branch performance is often overwhelmed by an interparty 
rivalry that colors oversight by producing either overly deferential or 
politically antagonistic (rather than objectively probing and curious) 
congressional committees.77 Moreover, Congress may enjoy even less 
public credibility than the executive branch, limiting their leverage 
against the President as well as the efficacy of their oversight. The open 
government laws that Congress has enacted include exceptions that 
sometimes swallow the statutory mandates whole.78 Presidential 
administrations and the bureaucracies they oversee have failed to 
perfectly comply with the demands that statutes place on them.79 At the 
same time, courts have often proven less than fully fearless in their 
willingness to enforce legal mandates against resistant government 
entities, deferring to formal executive privilege claims and more general 
 
 71. Frederick M. Kaiser et al., Cong. Research Serv., Congressional Oversight Manual 22–
32 (2011); Mathew P. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 165–66 (1984). 
 72. U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Beermann, supra note 70, at 84–90. 
 73. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (FOIA); id. § 552b (Government in the Sunshine Act); 
44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2006) (Presidential Records Act); Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1994) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (granting federal district courts jurisdiction under the FOIA to order 
production of documents “improperly withheld”). 
 75. See generally Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery 
Purposes, 43 Md. L. Rev. 119, 136–49 (1984) (describing federal rules of civil and criminal procedure 
as they apply to the government and their interplay with the FOIA). 
 76. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian 
Republic 25–26 (2010); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring 
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1655, 1660–73 (2006). 
 77. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
2311, 2344–47 (2006). 
 78. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 79. David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal 
Right-to-Know Laws, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1787, 1790 (2008). 
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arguments about the dangers of disclosure to national security.80 
Similarly, as critics regularly complain, whistleblower laws provide 
insufficient protection to employees who want to disclose information 
about government malfeasance.81 
Nevertheless, the assemblage of transparency laws provides a 
substantive, if imperfect, limitation on government secrecy. Most 
significantly, it establishes administrative norms from which secrecy is 
viewed as a departure, and it constructs a legal and ideological beachhead 
against which transparency advocates and political minorities and other 
groups seeking to pry information from the state can wage battle.82 This 
formal assemblage resembles a patchwork, one whose fabrics have 
variable weight and strength and cover significant practices and 
government entities, but that may be too frail and have too many bare 
patches to afford complete and comprehensive coverage. 
II.  Institutional and Informal Constraints on Secrecy 
The bare patches in the formal legal checks on secrecy appear to 
allow the executive branch to control significant quantities of information. 
The enormous public funds spent on classification reveal just how much 
the state thinks it can control information and how much it is willing to pay 
to try.83 But informal constraints on the state’s ability to keep secrets 
raise the costs of information control and lower the state’s ability to hold 
secrets.84 This Part briefly identifies and describes four such constraints: 
(1) the information flows that leaks create from all parts of the state, 
sometimes as part of an authorized program to achieve institutional 
political ends, and sometimes by an individual or group acting without 
authorization that hopes to subvert state policies and harm the current 
political regime or individual state actors; (2) bureaucratic errors that 
lead to information becoming public without authorization; (3) open 
sources that make available putatively “secret” information that the state 
attempts to protect; and (4) the messages that the state sends in its very 
 
 80. Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror: The Bush 
Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 Comm. L. & Pol’y 479, 486, 490–91 (2006); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 61–63. 
 81. Terance Miethe, Whistleblowing at Work: Tough Choices in Exposing Fraud, Waste, 
and Abuse on the Job 147–48 (1999). See generally Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act 
of 1989: A False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 355 (1991). 
 82. Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. 
Pa. J. Const. L. 1011, 1079 (2008) (noting the imperfections but importance and value of FOIA). 
 83. See discussion supra notes 31–32. 
 84. The use of the term “informal” here and elsewhere attempts to distinguish those practices 
that occur outside of or as an accident of the authority of formal government institutions. This is, 
admittedly, a rough distinction, and one that does not fit perfectly in every instance, but is intended as 
a helpful heuristic rather than a technical distinction. 
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practice of keeping secrets. This Part introduces the broad range of 
informal means by which information moves from the state, means that 
the remainder of the Article illustrates in detailed case studies. 
A. Leaks as Deliberate Informational Flows 
Unauthorized disclosure is the most well-known and widely discussed 
means by which information flows outside the state informally without 
either government sanction or legal obligation.85 “Unauthorized” in this 
context can mean quite different things depending on the leaker’s 
identity and purpose—a problem that efforts to legislate against leaks 
must confront.86 High-ranking officials frequently provide information 
“off-the-record” or “not for attribution” to a reporter as part of a 
coordinated plan to communicate with, cajole, or pressure outsiders—
including other agencies and branches of government, political parties, 
private interests, and the general public.87 Such leaks are pervasive in 
Washington, ubiquitous elements in a competitive democratic system 
served by competitive private news organizations.88 They are only 
“unauthorized” insofar as they provide information in an informal 
manner outside of official channels and formal disclosure processes.89 
 
 85. Recent works on leaks include Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable 
Presidency 51–82 (2012); William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of 
Leaking, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1453, 1467–70 (2008); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and 
Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 Ind. L.J. 233 (2008); David E. Pozen, The 
Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns, and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512 (2013). 
 86. On the complexity of defining “unauthorized disclosure” and Congress’s recent efforts to 
define it, see Steven Aftergood, What Is an Unauthorized Disclosure?, Secrecy News (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/08/unauthorized_disclosure.html; Josh Gerstein & Scott Wong, 
Bill to Plug Leaks Doesn’t Reach White House, Politico (July 31, 2012, 11:36 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/79237.html#ixzz22Jo2Qfcr; David Ignatius, Senate’s Anti-
Leaking Bill Doesn’t Address the Real Sources of Information, Wash. Post (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-senates-anti-leaking-bill-doesnt-address-the-
real-sources-of-information/2012/07/31/gJQAPBElNX_story.html. 
 87. See Keith V. Erickson, Presidential Leaks: Rhetoric and Mediated Political Knowledge, 
56 Comm. Monographs 199, 201 (1989); Adrienne M. Jamieson, The Messenger as Policy Maker: 
Thinking About the Press and Policy Networks in the Washington Community, in Democracy and 
North America 118–19 (Alan Ware ed., 1996); Leon V. Sigal, Official Secrecy and Informal 
Communication in Congressional-Bureaucratic Relations, 90 Pol. Sci. Q. 71, 72–74 (1975). 
 88. Affidavit of Max Frankel ¶ 5, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (71 Civ. 
2662), 1971 WL 224067 (noting that extensive government secrecy is “unraveled by that same 
Government, by Congress and by the press in one continuing round of professional and social contacts 
and cooperative and competitive exchanges of information”). Frankel recently wrote that the 
phenomenon continues to exist more than three decades later. Max Frankel, The Washington Back 
Channel, N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 25, 2007, at 40, 43. 
 89. The Obama administration, for example, coordinated access to information about the raid on 
Osama bin Laden’s hiding place in Pakistan for a sympathetic filmmaker even as federal agencies 
refused to disclose the same documents in response to FOIA requests. Glenn Greenwald, WH leaks 
for Propaganda Film, Salon (May 23, 2012, 5:32 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/05/23/ 
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High-ranking officials also leak frequently, usually passing information 
(including some that is classified) to writers and reporters in order to 
burnish or solidify their own reputations.90 These reciprocal relationships 
between source and press allow officials to trade information in exchange 
for publicity and status, among other things.91 
Unlike the high-level leakers or their agents who bear little or no risk 
of reprisal or prosecution, informal leaks made outside of the bureaucratic 
or political command chain—or, worse, in specific opposition to the state 
or administration—bear some risk of prosecution.92 Government 
employees enjoy little legal protection from retaliation by their employers 
when the employees’ actions are not subject to statutory whistleblower 
protection.93 When their leaks contain classified information, they may face 
prosecution under the Espionage Act—prohibiting unauthorized 
disclosure of “information respecting the national defense”94—and the 
Intelligence Agencies Identity Protection Act—prohibiting disclosure of 
“information identifying [a] covert agent.”95 The First Amendment offers 
leakers only thin protection, if any at all,96 and the reporters to whom 
they leak enjoy no First Amendment right to shield their sources’ 
identities—although they may have a common law federal right to do so, 
as well as statutory rights in some states.97 The news organizations that 
 
wh_leaks_for_propaganda_film; Andrea Stone, Obama Officials Gave Hollywood Filmmaker Access 
to Team That Killed Bin Laden, Records Show, Huffington Post (May 23, 2012, 10:11 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/23/white-house-kathryn-bigelow-bin-laden_n_1538847.html. 
 90. See Goldsmith, supra note 85, at 70–71. 
 91. Itzhak Galnoor, Government Secrecy: Exchanges, Intermediaries, and Middlemen, 35 Pub. 
Admin. Rev. 32, 40–41 (1975). 
 92. David Pozen persuasively argues that the institutional dynamics within the executive branch, 
which create incentives not only for individuals to leak but excellent reasons for the Department of 
Justice to under-enforce anti-leaking laws, lead to few formal criminal prosecutions of leakers and, as 
best as he could learn, few formal administration sanctions. Pozen, supra note 85, at 594. Left unclear, 
however, is the extent to which informal sanctions attach to mid- and low-level employees who leak 
without authorization—especially if they leak in a way that harms the administration or the agency 
that employs them. 
 93. On the limits of whistleblower statutes, see supra notes 54–57, 81 and accompanying text. 
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (2012). 
 95. 50 U.S.C. § 421(a)–(b) (2011). 
 96. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). Scholars vigorously disagree over this 
proposition. Compare Vladeck, supra note 57, at 1537–42 (asserting that recent Supreme Court precedent 
provides no First Amendment protection outside of statutory whistleblower protection), with Mary-Rose 
Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Employees, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 2117, 2119 
(2010) (characterizing current doctrine as distinguishing between government employee speech when on-
duty, when First Amendment protections do not apply, and when off-duty, when they do), and Heidi 
Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protections for 
Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 409, 421–26 (2013) (arguing in favor of 
First Amendment protection based on “constitutional text, structure, and principle”). 
 97. It is unlikely that reporters enjoy a First Amendment right to protect the identity of their 
leaks against criminal prosecution, and it is unclear if they enjoy a federal common law right to do so. 
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697 (1972) (finding no First Amendment right to protect 
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publish leaks enjoy First Amendment protection against prior restraint,98 
although they may still face prosecution under the Espionage Act for 
leaks of classified information.99 But notwithstanding the recent upticks 
in leak prosecutions by the Obama administration (some of which are 
being pursued as holdovers from the Bush administration), prosecutions 
for illegal disclosures are difficult for the government to pursue and win. 
The threat of prosecution and the cost of mounting a criminal defense 
might nevertheless be sufficient to deter many from leaking.100 
And yet, unauthorized disclosures by mid-level government 
personnel are common, despite the minimal protection from retaliation 
and prosecution that law provides whistleblowers, and despite of the 
normative punishments and constraints that further increase the risks and 
costs that government employees face in leaking information.101 For 
decades, internal government reports have regularly complained of the 
prevalence of classified information leaks102—the most embarrassing leaks 
for the government, and the ones for which leakers face the greatest risks 
of punishment and prosecution. Indeed, this phenomenon is as old as the 
nation itself.103 It occurs even in the most secretive and paranoid 
administrations, such as that of Richard Nixon, which sprung numerous, 
unauthorized leaks despite its illegal efforts to stop them.104 Truly 
 
identity of sources from a criminal investigation); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 
1141, 1145–49 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that Branzburg foreclosed a First Amendment right for 
reporters to shield sources against a grand jury investigation); id. at 1149–50 (noting a split opinion 
among three-judge panel on the question of common law privilege, but deciding that it would not 
apply in this case). On shield laws generally, see Sandra Davidson & David Herrera, Needed: More 
than a Paper Shield, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1277 (2012). For a compendium of state shield laws, 
see Rep. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/shieldmap.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2014). 
 98. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
 99. See id. at 743–48 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that the government can criminally 
prosecute newspapers after publication); id. at 733, 737 (White, J., concurring) (stating he would have 
“no difficulty” sustaining a conviction under the Espionage Act after publication). 
 100. See Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Administration Took Accidental Path to Setting Record for 
Leak Cases, N.Y. Times, June 20, 2012, at A14. 
 101. See Kielbowicz, supra note 14, at 478–80. Cf. Pozen, supra note 85, at 535–36 (arguing that the 
minimal formal legal protections for leaking belies the Department of Justice’s practice of under-
enforcing criminal sanctions). 
 102. See, e.g., Deputy Inspector Gen. for Intelligence & Special Program Assessments, Report 
on Sensitive Compartmented Information Leaks in the Department of Defense, Rep. No. 2012-056 
(2012); Comm’n on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States 381–84 (2005). 
 103. See Kielbowicz, supra note 14, at 433. 
 104. See Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon 108–25 
(1990). 
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successful bureaucratic secrecy requires powerful group identity and a 
common cause—and even then, the protected secrets emerge over time.105 
Nevertheless, this is not a perfect system for defeating excessive 
secrecy; indeed, it is not a system at all. The media to whom sources leak 
information are unregulated and largely unaccountable, except by 
professional norms of conduct and as market actors.106 The personal and 
institutional competition that drives journalists and their editors toward 
the “scoop” can render their reporting biased, partial, or even factually 
incorrect.107 Insofar as leaks merely check a system of information 
control, they do so randomly, and therefore lead to under- and over-
disclosure depending upon individual officials’ willingness to risk leaking 
and the government’s ability to stop them. Despite their non-systemic 
and nonobjective qualities and their seeming randomness, leaks 
commonly and regularly move information from the state, undercutting 
efforts to control information and raising the costs and risks of secrecy. 
B. Leaks as Accidental Informational Flows 
Bureaucracies can also simply fail to hold information. Lax security, 
for example, has resulted in unauthorized information disclosure by 
allowing dissidents to access, remove, and copy secret material. This 
occasionally results in the equivalent of leaks, though on a massive 
scale—most famously, in the cases of Daniel Ellsberg and Chelsea (born 
Bradley) Manning’s thefts of physical and digital documents, which 
produced the massive Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks disclosures 
respectively.108 In each instance, the state had granted or enabled access 
to information to officials, the officials grew disillusioned, and took 
advantage of their access to copy classified documents, which their 
superiors and the information security system failed to notice. Although 
the leaks were intentional, they were the consequence of mistakes—
especially in Manning’s case. The bureaucratic apparatus had expanded 
 
 105. See, e.g., Christopher Grey, Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking, and 
Organization Studies 121–32 (2012) (describing the role of secrecy in Bletchley Park, Britain’s highly 
successful World War II cryptographic unit, as well as its ultimate disclosure). 
 106. Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, New Republic, Aug. 13, 2008, at 31, 34; Schoenfeld, 
supra note 25, at 263–65. 
 107. See Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits? At What Cost? at 68 (1987); Note, 
Media Incentives and National Security Secrets, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2228, 2236–44 (2009). 
 108. For further discussion on Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers, see generally Daniel Ellsberg, 
Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers (2002); David Rudenstine, The Day the 
Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case 33–47 (1996). For further discussion on 
Manning, see David Leigh & Luke Harding, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy 
72–89 (2011); Greg Mitchell, The Age of WikiLeaks: From Collateral Murder to Cablegate 
(and Beyond) 38–50 (2011). 
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access to supposedly dreadful military secrets to individuals who in turn 
betrayed those secrets quite willingly.109 
Mistakenly allowing malfeasance is just one bureaucratic failure; 
sometimes officials inadvertently disclose information by simple mistake. 
As Washington Post reporters Dana Priest and William Arkin have 
documented, large quantities of classified and sensitive information are 
available via simple Internet searches and peer-to-peer file sharing 
software, often as a result of government employees’ insufficient security 
measures.110 In one recent example, the NSA mistakenly posted an 
unredacted version of a classified internal research article and then 
hastily declassified it in order to cover up the agency’s error.111 In 
another, a contractor hired by the Food and Drug Administration 
mistakenly posted on a public website documents produced in a vast 
surveillance program that the agency had undertaken to monitor the e-
mail traffic of several dissident employees.112 As the number of 
government employees and private contractors with security clearance 
expands, the likelihood that more massive leaks of electronic documents 
will occur also expands. In addition, in a reverse of the “mosaic theory” 
under which the government argues that otherwise non-classified 
information cannot be released under the FOIA because enemies can 
use it to piece together classified information,113 government officials can 
unknowingly provide small pieces of information that a reporter can 
piece together to form an accurate accounting of secret government 
action without an actual “leak.”114 The completed mosaic can in turn be 
delivered to the public in disparate forms like spy novels—even those 
published outside the United States.115 
 
 109. See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American 
Security State 267 (2011) (noting the series of security errors that allowed Manning to take and leak 
data). 
 110. Id. at 263–66. 
 111. Steven Aftergood, NSA Declassifies Secret Document After Publishing It, Secrecy News 
(May 14, 2012), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2012/05/nsa_secret. 
 112. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Vast FDA Effort Tracked E-mails of Its Scientists, N.Y. Times, 
July 15, 2012, at A1, 15. 
 113. See generally Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 
58 Admin. L. Rev. 845 (2006); David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the 
Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale L.J. 628 (2005). 
 114. See Martin Linsky, Impact: How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking 170–71, 192 (1986); 
see, e.g., Fed. Reserve, Transcript of Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on October 30–
31, 2007, at 4, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20071031meeting.pdf 
(transcribing the complaints of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke about the disclosure of 
confidential Federal Reserve policy as a result of a journalist’s having had many individual conversations with 
official sources, each of whom gave him “a little of the story”). 
 115. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Tom Clancy’s Books Put Bits and Pieces Together, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 
1987, at A5; Robert F. Worth, The Spy Novelist Who Knows Too Much, N.Y. Times Mag., Feb. 3, 
2013, at 18 (regarding Gérard de Villiers). 
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Mistaken and inadvertent disclosures are not systematic and many of 
them are never spotted or exploited, but in the aggregate they undercut 
government efforts to keep information secret. Whether kept in electronic 
form and therefore vulnerable to easy transfer by mistake or theft, or 
stored in someone’s memory and capable of being spoken, information is 
akin to liquid—capable of flowing from the place it is stored in directions 
and at a speed that make it impossible to fully control.116 
C. Information Flows Outside of the State’s Control 
The universe of information that constitutes the “secrets” that the 
state protects includes information that is available from non-state 
sources. Indeed, the intelligence community has increasingly relied on, 
and made public its reliance upon,117 what is called “open source 
intelligence”—information gathered from widely available sources, 
including mass media, government entities, and academic and 
professional journals.118 The fact that it is “open,” however, does not 
keep it from becoming “secret,” at least as a matter of law. The 
government has argued, with some success in the courts, that the open 
information it gathers can become secret when it is classified as a source, 
on the theory that disclosure of the state’s use of that information for 
national security purposes would allow the state’s enemies to learn its 
sources and piece together its knowledge and methods.119 No matter how 
one views the government’s claim that it can transform the open into the 
secret merely by possessing it, the existence of open source intelligence 
makes plain a salient fact: a great deal of valuable information exists and 
flows outside of the state’s ambit, and many of the state’s secrets are 
themselves based on public information.120 
 
 116. Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital 
Espionage, Crime, and Warfare 207–09 (2011). 
 117. Robert E. Barnsby So Long, and Thanks for All the Secrets: A Response to Professor Telman, 
63 Ala. L. Rev. 667, 686–87 (2012); Danley K. Cornyn, Note, The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the 
Internet: Preserving Operational Security and Servicemembers’ Right of Free Speech, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 
463, 464 (2008). 
 118. Richard A. Best, Jr. & Alfred Cumming, Cong. Research Serv., No. RL34270, Open 
Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress 6 (2007). See Stephen C. Mercado, Sailing the 
Sea of OSINT in the Information Age, 48 Stud. in Intelligence 45 (2004). 
 119. See supra note 114. 
 120. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 38–39. For example, environmental and geospatial information 
that the federal government sought to remove from the Internet after the September 11 attacks was 
nevertheless available from “industry and commercial businesses, academic institutions, Non-
governmental organizations, state and local governments, international suppliers, and even private 
citizens who publish their own relevant materials on the Internet.” John C. Baker et al., Mapping the 
Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial 
Information 124 (2004). 
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Covert operations, for example, are the most secret of a state’s 
actions, and the actions that the state most assiduously attempts to keep 
secret. They will produce an enormous number of internal documents 
sent by and to management and operations personnel that the state can 
at least theoretically control. But the state cannot easily control official 
information that it does not possess.121 A covert operation will have real 
world effects that civilian witnesses and the local news media can observe 
(which may provide the basis for reports and investigations by broader 
media sources that receive international distribution), and that 
government officials whose rule is being challenged and officials of other 
states can discover.122 Journalists and then the public first learned about 
the CIA’s post-9/11 “rendition” program, which flew suspected terrorists 
to various locations on private jets, through foreign newspapers, private 
websites run by aviation enthusiasts, and human rights advocates, all of 
which rely on public sources of information and eyewitnesses.123 Any 
informational sources outside of the state’s control that duplicate a 
“secret” state document or make available its content, or that allow 
outsiders to infer some secret, lessen the state’s ability to keep secrets.124 
D. Secrecy as Information 
Finally, the very act of publicly keeping secrets—that is, of 
controlling information in a manner that allows the public to know of the 
secrecy process—cannot stop the flow of information about secrecy, as 
well as speculation about what the secrets contain. To help understand 
these phenomena, assume the existence of both known and unknown 
secrets.125 The first category (“known unknowns”) includes information 
that the government is known to possess; all that is secret is the precise 
content of the information. For example, a publicly declared military 
operation will have numerous operational secrets; the public knows that 
such operations will exist and assumes the existence of secrets regarding 
those operations. Indeed, controlling such secrecy is a long and widely 
accepted prerogative of the President—it is as clear an application of the 
privilege doctrine as exists.126 Nevertheless, the content of such secrets 
 
 121. See Galnoor, supra note 91, at 34–35. 
 122. See infra Part V.B (analyzing a covert operation where multiple sources of information were 
available to contemporary observers and to historians after the fact). 
 123. Brenner, supra note 116, at 168–69. 
 124. See infra Part IV.B (providing case studies of redacted documents whose “secret” contents 
were available through public sources). 
 125. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but that [at time of 
war] a government might prevent . . . the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number 
and location of troops.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (quoting Near). 
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can be the subject of speculation, as can the steps the military and 
government take to control information about their operations. The 
second category (“unknown unknowns”) includes unknown information 
such as a successfully covert operation of which the public has not 
become aware. The secrecy of such a program is complete and deep—the 
public is not even aware of its own ignorance, and thus cannot speculate 
about its context.127 
Now, assume that at some point after the covert operation’s 
completion, the public learns of its existence, whether from official, 
authorized disclosures or via leaks or open sources. This Article contends 
that many, if not most, of such secrets migrate to the known-secrets 
category over time by the means that this Part and the previous one 
identified—legal disclosure mandates, leaks, mistakes, and open sources.128 
The once-covert operation is now known, and at least some of its secrets 
have been disclosed. Other formerly unknown-unknown secrets have now 
become known unknowns, or secrets about a known event, and some of 
them can be inferred from disclosed information. Having learned of this 
covert operation, the public has also become aware of the government’s 
willingness to keep information secret and its ability to do so. 
Two consequences flow from this. First, informed members of the 
public—especially the press—will infer both from the fact of the past 
covert operation and the fact that certain kinds of secrets were kept that 
the government might have engaged in or might be developing similar 
operations. Some investigative reporters and interested individuals will 
try to uncover any such additional operations. Their efforts might prove 
easier now that the first operation has become public. Some government 
officials who are troubled either by another operation or by its secrecy 
might be more willing to leak information to the press about the 
additional operation(s), while reporters will now have a better sense not 
only of what to look for but of where to look and whom to ask. Perhaps 
the operation’s previous success at maintaining control over information 
proves difficult to repeat, or the circle of individuals included in the 
covert group widens, increasing the likelihood of leaks and mistakes. The 
unknown unknowns will thereby become more difficult to keep secret. 
Second, now that the broader, less-informed public knows that such 
secret programs exist, some of them, and particularly those opposed to 
the current government, will begin to speculate about additional secret 
 
 127. This secrecy does not preclude the President’s required reporting of his finding that the action 
“is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to 
the national security of the United States” to congressional intelligence committees in at least a 
“timely fashion.” 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a) (2011). Congressional access to the information is strictly limited 
by statute. Id. § 413b(c). 
 128. For more on the temporary nature of most deep secrets, see discussion supra note 18. 
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programs. Their speculation might be wrong, perhaps even wildly wrong, 
but it can affect the government’s broader legitimacy, and especially the 
legitimacy of its secret programs.129 As the sociologist Georg Simmel 
wrote, the “natural impulse to idealization, and the natural timidity of 
men, operate to one and the same end in the presence of secrecy; viz., to 
heighten it by phantasy, and to distinguish it by a degree of attention that 
published reality could not command.”130 Secrecy thus cannot stop the 
production of information and of meaning about government actions. It 
can control information about “deep secrets” of which the public is fully 
ignorant, but its success in doing so may prove only temporary. Once its 
extraordinary efforts to retain secrets are revealed—that is, once the 
government can no longer control information about its own secrecy—
the state faces greater resistance against its further efforts to control the 
flow of government information and must satisfy a more skeptical public 
that is more prone to speculation and investigation.131 In this regard, the 
practice of keeping secrets itself constitutes information. 
These are broad categories of the ways that secrecy fails. This 
Article presents them here to lay the groundwork for the case studies 
below. These studies illustrate the complex ways, both formal and 
especially informal, by which secrecy proves difficult to maintain. Each 
case exhibits the same pattern: the state fails to keep secrets despite its 
extraordinary, legally permissible efforts to control information. 
III.  Vice President Cheney and the Executive Branch’s Imperfect 
Information Control 
This Part proceeds from the uncontroversial assumptions that the 
George W. Bush administration attempted to protect executive branch 
information more closely than any president since Richard Nixon, and 
that within the Bush White House no figure appeared more obsessed 
 
 129. Kathryn S. Olmsted, Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, 
World War I to 9–11 at 238–40 (2009); Kermit L. Hall, The Virulence of the National Appetite for 
Bogus Revelation, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1, 36–38 (1997). 
 130. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, 11 Am. J. Soc. 441, 465 (1906). 
 131. In one recent episode, the Obama administration has continued to claim that its use of drone 
aircraft to attack terrorists in foreign countries is classified and therefore exempt from the Freedom of 
Information Act long after members of the administration have bragged of the program’s successes. 
See Conor Friedersdorf, The Increasingly Absurd Conceit That Drone Strikes Are Secret, Atlantic 
(June 22, 2012, 10:54 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-increasingly-
absurd-conceit-that-drone-strikes-are-secret/258842. It has done so despite the fact that the program’s 
existence was extensively documented in a largely flattering portrayal in a prominent national 
newspaper. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret “Kill List” Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and 
Will, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2012, at A1. The administration’s unwillingness to concede the program’s 
existence officially by declassifying relevant documents has delegitimzed its efforts to keep secrets 
about other programs, as well as its commitment to transparency. 
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with controlling information than Vice President Cheney.132 Although the 
administration and Cheney ultimately hitched their obsession to the fast-
moving expansion of military and intelligence operations in response to 
the 2001 terrorist attacks,133 they had begun to limit public and 
congressional access to information well before then. During the first 
months of Bush’s first term, Cheney sought to establish tight control over 
executive branch information in his management of the administration’s 
energy policy.134 Cheney won this legal battle, as the formal mechanisms 
intended to limit secrecy could not contain the formal mechanisms that 
allow it.135 This Part begins with a narrative telling of this control, which 
includes a sketch of the theoretical justification that Cheney, among 
others, developed for it. But the Vice President’s formal legal victories 
could not foreclose the seepage of information from the executive 
branch. The remainder of this Part describes the complex set of leaks—
along with journalists’ and advocates’ informed and uninformed inferences 
about the work Cheney oversaw—that undercut the ideals that the Vice 
President’s theory of executive privilege presumes. These leaks reveal how 
Cheney’s effort functionally lost the battle he launched to control 
information. 
A. The Information Control Narrative 
George W. Bush established the NEPDG soon after his 
inauguration.136 The NEPDF was intended, as its name declared, to 
organize the incoming administration’s development of a comprehensive 
national energy policy. The task force was chaired by Vice President 
 
 132. See Michael Isikoff & David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the 
Selling of the Iraq War 423 (2006); Robert M. Pallitto & William G. Weaver, Presidential 
Secrecy and the Law 46 (2007); Alasdair Roberts, The Collapse of Fortress Bush: The Crisis of 
Authority in American Government 135–36 (2008); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: 
Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 489, 491–92 (2007); Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 
76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 197, 198 (2008). 
 133. Nancy V. Baker, General Ashcroft: Attorney at War 176–96 (2006). 
 134. Biographical studies of Cheney offer a general introduction to the episode, as well as an inside 
glimpse of Cheney and the Office of the Vice President’s work on the energy policy task force. See 
Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency 81–82, 90–94, 104–07 (2008); Stephen F. 
Hayes, Cheney: The Untold Story of America’s Most Powerful and Controversial Vice 
President 310–18, 323–27 (2007). 
 135. Expansive treatments of the legal and political issues in this episode, which are uniformly 
critical of the administration and especially of the Vice President, include Fisher, supra note 47, at 
183–96; Mark J. Rozell & Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Executive Privilege and the Bush Administration, 
24 J.L. & Pol. 1, 12–27 (2008). See generally Eric R. Dannenmaier, Executive Exclusion and the 
Cloistering of the Cheney Energy Task Force, 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 329 (2008). 
 136. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., National Energy Policy: Reliable, Affordable, and 
Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future viii (2001) [hereinafter NEPDG Report]. 
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Cheney and run by members of Cheney’s staff.137 The project did not 
begin from a blank slate: one of the Bush campaign’s early key policy 
goals was to prioritize energy development over environmental concerns, 
and a unit of President Bush’s post-election transition team had begun to 
develop an energy policy for the incoming administration.138 Given the 
issue’s significance, the administration clearly viewed NEPDG’s 
formation as a key moment in the early days of the new presidency. The 
task force’s membership included presidential cabinet members who 
directed the agencies that would implement many of the group’s 
recommendations, as well as high-ranking appointees in the Executive 
Office of the President who would oversee and organize presidential 
oversight of the resulting energy policy.139 The Vice President would 
ultimately lead a centralized, top-down policy development process in 
which the President’s and especially the Vice President’s preferences 
would drive the committee’s deliberations and conclusions.140 
The task force only existed briefly, and disbanded when its final 
report was released four months after its formation. During that period, 
however, its principals met with hundreds of corporate executives and 
interest group representatives, the vast majority of whom represented 
the energy industry and especially the extractive industries.141 Task force 
members and staff almost entirely ignored environmental organizations, 
and any access the latter enjoyed to NEPDG was pro forma.142 Indeed, 
the final report’s most significant prescriptions reflected the extractive 
industries’ preferences. It advocated efforts to seek new domestic sources 
of oil and gas, including on public lands (such as the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge) and offshore, and diplomatic and commercial efforts to 
forge global trade alliances that would expand American access to 
foreign oil.143 It also championed regulatory support for the expansion of 
 
 137. Hayes, supra note 134, at 311–13; Mike Allen & Dana Milbank, Cheney’s Role Offers 
Strengths and Liabilities, Wash. Post, May 17, 2001, at A1. 
 138. Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 341, 343 (2002); Susan Milligan, Energy Bill a Special-Interests Triumph, Bos. Globe, Oct. 4, 
2004, at A1. 
 139. NEPDG Report, supra note 136, at v. 
 140. See Gen. Accounting Office, Energy Task Force: Process Used to Develop the National 
Energy Policy 6–8 (2003) [hereinafter Energy Task Force Report]; Gellman, supra note 134, at 88–
91; Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of 
Paul O’Neill 146–49 (2004); Allen & Milbank, supra note 137, at A1. 
 141. See Michael Abramowitz & Steven Mufson, Papers Detail Industry’s Role in Cheney’s Energy 
Report, Wash. Post, July 18, 2007, at A1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See NEPDG Report, supra note 136, at 5-20 to 5-22 (summarizing recommendations for 
increasing domestic energy supply); id. at 8-1 to 8-3 (discussing “Strengthening Global Alliances”). For 
summaries of the policy, see Bryner, supra note 138, at 359–80; Michael T. Klare, The Bush/Cheney 
Energy Strategy: Implications for U.S. Foreign and Military Policy, 36 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 395, 
397–403 (2004). For the immediate political reaction to it, see Joseph Curl, Bush Sees Dual Goals of 
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nuclear power generation. Although such prescriptions may have proved 
politically controversial and widely contested as a matter of policy—
particularly for environmental groups opposed to many of NEPDG’s 
priorities—the report’s substantive conclusions and influence on policy 
seemed to represent the standard stuff of policy development for a first-
term Republican president. They could not have surprised anyone.144 
The task force’s intentional and well-planned commitment to 
secrecy,145 however, was both controversial and surprising. NEPDG did 
not open its meetings and deliberations to the public, nor did it provide a 
list of the private entities and individuals with whom it met to the public, 
press, or even Congress. Cheney also directed the energy industry 
executives with whom he and NEPDG met not to mention their 
involvement in the NEPDG to the press or public.146 
This informational strategy was itself part of Cheney’s strong 
commitment to implementing a constitutional theory of unitary executive 
power.147 The theory began to emerge as a prevailing concept in 
contemporary conservative constitutional theory with then-Representative 
Cheney’s direction of the Minority Report to Congress’s formal 
investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, which concerned the Reagan 
administration’s covert operation to evade legislative restrictions on 
supporting Nicaraguan Contra rebels through secret arms sales to Iran.148 
Focusing largely upon the extent of the President’s sole authority over 
foreign affairs, the Minority Report discussed why the President must be 
free from extensive congressional intervention—whether from direct 
congressional oversight or from legislation that would force the executive 
branch to open itself to public view.149 Its claim did not connect the 
President’s prerogative to a particular, well-defined legal authority or 
doctrine, nor did it limit its reach to trump particular legislative enactments 
 
Energy, Environment, Wash. Times, May 18, 2001, at A1; Carolyn Lochhead, Bush Faces Tough Fight 
on Energy Strategy—Reaction: Criticism from Environmentalists, S.F. Chron., May 18, 2001, at A1. 
 144. See Lou Dubose & Jake Bernstein, Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American 
Presidency 6 (2006). 
 145. See Suskind, supra note 140, at 143–44. 
 146. See Gellman, supra note 134, at 92. 
 147. Roberts, supra note 10, at 62–64. 
 148. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H.R. 
Rep. No. 100-433, S. Rep. No. 100-216, at 431–585 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Affair Report]. 
For narrative accounts of Cheney’s intellectual development that place the Minority Report at its 
center, see Harold H. Bruff, Bad Advice: Bush’s Lawyers in the War on Terror 58–59 (2009); 
Dick Cheney & Liz Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir 143–48 (2011); Jack 
Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 86–88 
(2007); Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental 
Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2070, 2098–2100 (2009) (tying the Minority 
Report to the “unitary executive” theory). 
 149. Iran-Contra Affair Report, supra note 148, at 457–469. 
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that constrained the President; rather, using an amorphous ideal of 
separate powers, the Minority Report reasoned both formalistically and 
tautologically that the President has the inherent power within his 
separate and distinct sphere of authority because he is the President:150 
the elected leader of an essential, wholly independent unit with muscular, 
well-defined powers.151 
An integral element of this concept is the President’s legal and 
political control over executive branch information—an argument that 
Cheney had pressed while a White House aide during the Ford 
administration.152 The President must be able to have significant control 
over when and how the information on which he relies and the 
information that he produces is disclosed,153 as he is best suited to take 
decisive action with the “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” that 
foreign policy and other key tasks delegated by the Constitution to the 
President often require.154 The multi-headed fractious Congress, by 
contrast, can neither act decisively nor keep its plans or the information 
that it receives secret, and therefore should have limited access to certain 
kinds of information and no authority to undercut the President’s ability to 
keep secrets.155 And it was in the struggle over energy policy information 
that Cheney began his effort from within the White House to establish this 
theory’s preeminence in the executive branch and in the courts. 
B. The Legal Fight Over NEPDG Information 
In May 2001, in response to a request from two Democratic 
members of Congress, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
began to investigate the membership of NEPDG.156 Using its broad 
 
 150. Id. at 387–92, 457–59 (citing The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison)). 
 151. The key works in contemporary unitary executive theory began to appear in the decade after 
the Minority Report. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses As Power Grants, 88 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1377 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To 
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 570–99 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The 
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992). 
 152. Bruce P. Montgomery, Subverting Open Government: White House Materials and 
Executive Branch Politics 5 (2006); Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial 
Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy 34–38 (2007). 
 153. See Dick Cheney, Congressional Overreaching in Foreign Policy, in Foreign Policy and the 
Constitution 101, 115 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990). 
 154. Iran-Contra Affair Report, supra note 148, at 459–60 (quoting The Federalist No. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton)); see also id. at 468 (citing The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay) (advocating that 
the President, not the Senate, should have the sole power to negotiate foreign treaties because of his 
ability to maintain secrecy)). 
 155. Id. at 437–38, 576–79. 
 156. Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2002); Jerry Seper, Justice Asks Court to 
Dismiss GAO Suit Against Cheney, Wash. Times, May 23, 2002, at A3. 
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statutory authority to investigate executive branch expenditures,157 the 
GAO formally requested NEPDG’s records.158 Cheney and his legal 
counsel, David Addington, denied the GAO’s request, declaring first to 
the GAO and then ultimately to Congress that such congressional 
demands for information “intrude into the heart of Executive 
deliberations,” and that the documents were constitutionally privileged.159 
The denial provoked the Comptroller General, who leads the GAO, to 
take the unprecedented step of filing suit against the Vice President to 
demand the records’ disclosure.160 
The Vice President deployed the same strategy to defeat claims that 
the NEPDG owed any duty to reveal information directly to the press 
and public. Executive branch control had been intentionally embedded 
in NEPDG’s structure and organizational DNA, as Addington had 
specifically designed NEPDG to avoid falling within the purview of the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (the “FACA”),161 the federal statute 
that imposes open record and open meeting obligations on advisory 
committees within the executive branch that are not entirely composed 
of federal employees.162 In June 2001, while Cheney was in the midst of 
his dispute with the GAO over disclosures to Congress, Judicial Watch (a 
conservative governmental watchdog group) and the Sierra Club (an 
environmental group) submitted requests under the FOIA and FACA 
for the same documents that the GAO sought.163 After their requests 
were denied, these groups separately filed suit against NEPDG and a 
panoply of officials associated with it, claiming, among other things, 
violations of FOIA and FACA.164 
Cheney ultimately won all of his legal battles to keep NEPDG’s 
internal records secret. The GAO litigation ended in December 2002 
after the trial court granted Cheney’s motion to dismiss the Comptroller 
General’s complaint, ruling that he lacked standing to sue under 
Article III.165 Defeated during the post-9/11 period and following a 
midterm election that saw the administration’s political popularity and 
governmental authority rise to great heights, the GAO decided not to 
 
 157. See 31 U.S.C. § 712 (2006) (requiring the Comptroller General to investigate executive agency 
expenditures of public money). 
 158. Jeff Gerth, Accounting Office Demands Energy Task Force Records, N.Y. Times, July 19, 
2001, at A20; Jerry Seper, Justice Asks Court to Dismiss GAO Suit Against Cheney, Wash. Times, 
May 23, 2002, at A3. 
 159. See Gellman, supra note 134, at 104; see also Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 57. 
 160. See Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 54. 
 161. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006). 
 162. Gellman, supra note 134, at 91; Hayes, supra note 134, at 313–14. 
 163. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 74–75. 
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appeal, although it has continued to assert that the court’s decision was 
incorrect.166 
Though more legally and procedurally complicated, the Judicial 
Watch and Sierra Club suits, which were consolidated and concerned 
requests for documents from officials affiliated with NEPDG besides the 
Vice President, met a similar fate as the GAO’s suit. Having defeated 
some of the defendants’ motions to dismiss in district court,167 the 
plaintiffs appeared poised to begin receiving through civil discovery the 
NEPDG documents that they hoped would assist them in their claim that 
FACA applied to NEPDG. The Vice President immediately sought a 
writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit that would halt the District 
Court’s discovery order on the grounds that it constituted a breach of 
executive authority and privilege that violated the constitutional 
separation of powers. Although he lost in the D.C. Circuit,168 Cheney 
prevailed in the Supreme Court.169 The Court held both that the D.C. 
Circuit could issue a writ of mandamus,170 and that the District Court’s 
discovery order to assist plaintiffs in pursuit of their claims was not 
narrow enough.171 On remand, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, issued 
the writ and directed the case’s dismissal.172 Strictly construing FACA in 
light of the separation of powers concerns, the court held that the group 
was not an advisory committee subject to FACA because only its official 
members, all of whom were government employees, could vote on matters 
before the NEPDG.173 
Cheney emerged victorious from his battles with Congress and the 
public interest groups that sought to open the energy policy he oversaw. 
His success seemed to validate his long-term strategy of establishing 
control over executive branch information, which he carried out through 
NEPDG’s institutional design and the aggressive litigation strategy that 
turned initial legal setbacks into ultimate triumph. Cheney prevailed by 
brandishing an expansive ideal of executive privilege over information. 
His victory over Congress and public interest environmental groups sent 
a signal to opponents: the White House would use its vast financial, legal, 
 
 166. See Energy Task Force Report, supra note 140, at 3 n.7; Peter M. Shane, Madison’s 
Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy 126 (2009); Louis Fisher, 
Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52 Duke L.J. 323, 391–92 
(2002); Peter Brand & Alexander Bolton, GOP Threats Halted GAO Cheney Suit, The Hill, Feb. 19, 
2003, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0219-12.htm. 
 167. Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 56–57. 
 168. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 169. Cheney v. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 378 (2004). 
 170. Id. at 382, 391. 
 171. Id. at 387–88. 
 172. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 173. Id. at 728. 
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and political resources to resist the release of any information that it did 
not want to disclose.174 
C. The Limits of Information Control 
Cheney’s victories seemed to confirm his constitutional and political 
theory of the executive branch’s paramount authority to control 
information. It helped, of course, that his theory had already gained 
significant purchase through republican appointments to the federal 
bench175 and its circulation by conservative public law scholars in the 
legal academy.176 But an administration cannot achieve full control over 
the complex network of executive branch agencies that interacted with 
the NEPDG merely through the support of a majority of appellate 
judges in high-profile cases.177 The Bush administration had lost a 
number of battles along the way to winning the various lawsuits seeking 
information. By the time of the D.C. Circuit’s dismissal of the public 
interest groups’ lawsuit under the FOIA and FACA, several agencies 
had already complied with the District Court’s discovery orders, in the 
process releasing some documents that Cheney continued to withhold to 
the plaintiffs and therefore to the public.178 The National Resources 
Defense Council obtained documents in early 2002 through a suit against 
the Department of Energy that showed pervasive industry influence over 
the resulting administration energy policy.179 Along with communications 
 
 174. See Gellman, supra note 134, at 93–94. 
 175. The separate Supreme Court opinions in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), line 
up to some degree along a continuum, with Justices Ginsburg and Souter in dissent, Justice Stevens 
offering a much more limited concurrence, a four justice plurality (with, to be sure, Justice Breyer 
joining), and Justices Thomas and Scalia providing a partial concurrence that emphasized the serious 
constitutional concerns for the separation of powers and the relative autonomy of the executive 
branch if the public interest groups could proceed with discovery. See id. at 392 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); id. at 393–94 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 396 (Ginsburg, 
J. dissenting). More strikingly, Republican appointees decided the key lower court decisions in the 
administration’s favor. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 412 F.3d 125, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(Ginsburg, J.) (Reagan appointee); In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 731 (en banc) (Randolph, J.) (George H. 
W. Bush appointee); Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2002) (Bates, J.) (George 
W. Bush appointee). 
 176. See Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement 147–169 (2008). The 
unitary executive theory has also made inroads into center-left jurisprudence, where a version holds 
sway among proponents of a strong presidency to manage the administrative state. See Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 105–06 (1994); 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2252 (2001). 
 177. See generally Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 Admin. L. Rev. 
617, 636–37 (2010) [hereinafter Fenster, Seeing the State] (noting how the sprawling complexity of the 
federal administrative state makes transparency difficult to impose). 
 178. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 726 n.1. 
 179. See generally Order, Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D. D.C. 
2002) (granting plaintiff’s motion for release of responsive records); The Cheney Energy Task Force, 
Nat’l Res. Defense Council (Mar. 27, 2002), http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/taskforce/tfinx.asp. This 
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between oil and gas lobbyists and NEPDG officials that demonstrated 
the Group’s close relationship to industry,180 Judicial Watch obtained 
from the Department of Commerce a series of maps documenting oil fields 
and prospects for contracts and projects to extract oil in the Middle East, 
including Iraq.181 
Other sources also allowed information to seep out. While the 
NEPDG worked, major print media frequently discussed the 
administration’s ties to the energy industry and predicted that these 
favored interests would gain from Bush’s energy plan.182 At the same time, 
NEPDG’s plans for its report were leaked to the press,183 which reported 
that energy industry representatives, including Enron C.E.O. Kenneth 
Lay, had met with the Vice President and others in the energy task 
force.184 Indeed, Cheney’s effort to control information itself became an 
important media story during the NEPDG’s existence, and the press 
quickly identified secrecy as Cheney’s preferred political strategy.185 In 
addition to the press’s extensive reporting on documents released in 
connection with the NEPDG litigation showing the energy industry’s 
influence on the administration’s energy policy,186 the New York Times 
 
litigation endured until 2005, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in the Department of Energy’s favor. 
Judicial Watch, 412 F.3d at 133. 
 180. Savage, supra note 152, at 86 (describing memoranda); Judicial Watch v. National Energy Policy 
Development Group, et al., Judicial Watch, http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/judicial-watch-v-national-
energy-policy-development-group-et-al (June 27, 2012) (describing documents as the result of litigation). 
 181. Maps and Charts of Iraqi Oil Fields, Judicial Watch (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/bulletins/maps-and-charts-of-iraqi-oil-fields. 
 182. Joseph Kahn & David E. Sanger, President Offers Plan to Promote Oil Exploration, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 30, 2001, at A1; Jim VandeHei, Democrats Take Aim at Bush Weak Spot: Administration’s 
Ties to Energy Industry, Wall St. J., May 16, 2001, at A24; Dan Morgan, Coal Scores With Wager on 
Bush, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 2001, at A05; Tom Hamburger, Laurie McGinley, & David Cloud, 
Influence Market: Industries That Backed Bush Are Now Seeking Return on Investment, Wall St. J., 
Mar. 6, 2001, at A1. 
 183. See e.g., Peter Behr & Alan Sipress, Energy Panel Seeks Review of Sanctions & Oil Production in 
Iraq, Iran and Libya Seen as Critical, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 2001, at A13; Bob Davis, Bush Energy Plan 
Increases Reliance on Nuclear Power—Task Force Aims to Boost Supplies of Natural Gas with Pipelines, 
Drilling, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 2001, at A3; Kahn & Sanger, supra note 182, at A1. 
 184. See Bob Davis & Rebecca Smith, Power Politics: In Era of Deregulation, Enron Woos 
Regulators More Avidly Than Ever—CEO Lay Leaves an Imprint on Bush Energy Plan, Seeks Friends 
at FERC—An Interstate for Electricity, Wall St. J., May 18, 2001, at A1; Kahn & Sanger, supra note 
182; Mike Allen & Dana Milbank, Cheney’s Role Offers Strengths and Liabilities, Wash. Post, May 17, 
2001, at A1; Dana Milbank & Eric Pianin, Energy Task Force Works in Secret; Like Clinton Health 
Effort, Cheney Group Aims to Limit Leaks, Flak, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 2001, at A1. 
 185. See Milbank & Pianin, supra note 184. 
 186. See Dana Milbank, Bush Energy Order Wording Mirrors Oil Lobby’s Proposal; Directive 
Targeted Regulations With “Adverse Effects”, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 2002, at A27; Dana Milbank & 
Mike Allen, Energy Task Force Belatedly Consulted Environmentalists; Documents Show 
Administration Sought Input Only After Protests, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 2002, at A02; Mike Allen, 
Cheney, Aides Met With Enron 6 Times in 2001; Counsel: Energy Policy Was Topic, Wash. Post, 
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revealed that eighteen of the top twenty-five contributors to the 
Republican Party enjoyed special access to the NEPDG—including, in 
Enron’s case, access to the Vice President himself.187 Less than eighteen 
months later, the GAO issued its report on the process that NEPDG 
used to draft its report, which authoritatively documented Cheney’s 
tight-fisted control of the NEPDG, as well as contacts among the Office 
of the Vice President, other principal NEPDG members, and energy 
industry executives and representatives.188 The GAO report also revealed 
the Vice President’s efforts to keep the NEPDG’s work secret. 
Cheney’s failed efforts to control information paralleled the 
NEPDG’s failure as a political entity. Vocal and institutional opposition 
to what many suspected would emerge as the administration’s energy 
policy coalesced soon after the NEPDG’s formation, raising doubts 
about whether the administration would offer anything more than 
industry’s preferred policies.189 The NEPDG Report did not influence 
Congress, as a bill that the administration supported and the Republican-
controlled House had passed failed in the Senate, which had a bare 
majority of Democrats, while the Senate passed its own energy bill.190 It 
was not until 2005, after President Bush’s reelection and with larger 
Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, that Congress finally 
enacted a new energy bill—one that, notably, did not include some of the 
most controversial NEPDG proposals, such as opening the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge to drilling.191 Public opinion polls taken soon 
after the Report’s release suggested that the Report also failed to 
 
Jan. 9, 2002, at A3; Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neela Banerjee, Bush Energy Paper Followed Industry Push, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2002, at A20. 
 187. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neela Banerjee, Top G.O.P. Donors in Energy Industry Met Cheney 
Panel, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2002, at A1. 
 188. Energy Task Force Report, supra note 140, at 6–8, 15–18. 
 189. See Jeanne Cummings, Power Politics: Energy Crisis Offers Clues to the Workings of Bush 
Administration—Cheney Does Heavy Lifting and Bush Rides Agenda; Taste for Horse-Trading—“A 
Lot of Pain in the West”, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 2001, at A1; John J. Fialka & Jeanne Cummings, White 
House Sets Cabinet-Level Study to Develop a National Energy Policy, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 2001, at A6; 
Kahn & Sanger, supra note 182. 
 190. Eric Pianin, A Stinging Repudiation Engineered by 3 Democrats, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 2002, 
at A09. The Republican-controlled House of Representatives had introduced and passed a bill that 
contained about eighty percent of the task force’s proposals soon after the NEPDG Report was issued. 
See Juliet Eilperin & Eric Pianin, House GOP Energy Bill Trims President’s Plan, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 
2001, at A2. In late 2001, Senate Democrats introduced their own bill that focused on conservation, 
efficiency, and developing new energy sources, which the Senate passed in April 2002. See Helen 
Dewar, Senate Approves Energy Measure; Scaled-Back Bill Pushes Conservation, Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 
2002, at A01. The two bills were never reconciled. Mike Allen, Bush’s Energy Plan Stalled; Partisan 
Differences and President’s Priorities Created Impasse, Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 2003, at A06. 
 191. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005); See Charles Babington & 
Justin Blum, On Capitol Hill, a Flurry of GOP Victories; Key Measures Advance After Long Delays, 
Wash. Post, July 30, 2005, at A01. 
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persuade the public that its prescriptions were objectively wise and worth 
pursuing, as many Americans thought that Bush was “too closely tied to 
the energy industry and insufficiently devoted to conservation.”192 The 
NEPDG’s substantive prescriptions might have proved so unpopular and 
politically untenable that even the most transparent and accessible 
advisory committee that offered the same prescriptions would have 
suffered the same fate. But secrecy certainly did not help the 
administration’s efforts to sell its policy and might well have hurt them—
a hypothesis espoused even by some members of the administration.193 
Environmental non-governmental organizations likely agreed, as 
they used the NEPDG’s secrecy, and their legal challenges to it, as both 
symbol and evidence of the administration’s capture by oil and gas 
interests. The Sierra Club, for example, trumpeted its litigation efforts to 
its donors, using it as an opportunity to demonstrate its essential role in 
fighting what it characterized as Cheney’s secretive, lawless behavior.194 
As one commentator sympathetically noted about the environmental 
groups opposed to the Bush administration, the Sierra Club and the 
National Resources Defense Counsel seemed more exercised about the 
secretive and exclusionary process by which the energy policy had been 
developed than about the policy itself.195 The stealth process, environmental 
groups argued, suggested that more than mere policy was at stake in the 
energy debate. 
Administration critics generally viewed the NEPDG episode through 
such inferences. The authors of Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the 
American Presidency characterized the NEPDG as “a government-
sanctioned industry cabal” that had drawn up a self-dealing and 
destructive energy policy and had worked in secret to cover up the 
corrupt enterprise.196 Some critics accused Cheney of trying to hide his 
efforts to enrich his friends in the energy industry.197 Some imagined far 
worse, particularly when viewing the NEPDG retrospectively through 
 
 192. Greg Hitt, Shailagh Murray, & Jeffrey Ball, Increasingly Skeptical Congress Takes up Bush 
Energy Plan—NAS Study Deals Blow by Concluding Auto Makers Can Sharply Boost SUV Fuel 
Economy, Wall St. J., July 31, 2001, at A20. 
 193. See Gellman, supra note 134, at 93; Hayes, supra note 134, at 324. Cf. Savage, supra note 
152, at 90 (quoting associate White House counsel as acknowledging that the documents sought in the 
litigation contained “nothing of interest”). 
 194. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Success Highlights: Celebrating Sierra Club’s 2010 Charitable 
Victories 4 (2010) (identifying its role in litigation as evidence of its chairman’s “leadership”); Sierra 
Club Found., 2004 Annual Report 6–7 (2004) (identifying its role in litigation as one of the year’s 
“highlights”). 
 195. See Dannenmaier, supra note 135, at 375–76. 
 196. Dubose & Bernstein, supra note 144, at 21. 
 197. See Robert Bryce, Cronies: Oil, the Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America’s Superstate 
(2004); John W. Dean, Worse than Watergate, 42–53 (2004); Gellman, supra note 134, at 93–94; 
John Nichols, Dick: The Man Who Is President (2004). 
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the lens of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Both the existence of the Iraq 
oilfields map that was disclosed in discovery,198 along with the fact that it 
had been kept secret, suggested to critics that the war in Iraq and the 
administration’s hawkish, neoconservative foreign policy were products 
of the administration’s energy policy.199 Worse still, according to those 
who believe the administration either knew or was involved in the 2001 
terrorist attacks, the entire episode unveiled the administration’s secret 
conspiracy to achieve global domination for an imperial America.200 Such 
theories no doubt would have developed even in a more information-rich 
environment where authoritative official documents and their 
provenance were available and widely acknowledged. But they positively 
blossomed in conditions that were defined by the grand, dramatic struggle 
to obtain documentary evidence. 
The Vice President may have thought he was controlling access to 
information—an assumption that his most vociferous critics share—but 
he could not contain either the circulation of information or the 
interpretation of that which circulated. The most significant pre-9/11 
battle over government secrecy and the executive branch’s authority to 
control information demonstrated the power of laws protecting executive 
privilege, the potential of formal laws and legal processes to force the 
disclosure of information and to focus political pressure on the 
government, and ultimately, the difficulty of keeping secrets. 
IV.  Redaction Failures: Imperfect Information Control in the 
Release of Documents 
Vice President Cheney sought to maximize the executive branch’s 
legal authority to control executive branch information; by contrast, 
some executive branch secrecy practices work within limits that the 
Constitution and Congress set on the state’s ability to keep information 
from the public. When it releases documents from which text has been 
“redacted” (that is, obscured with a black mark or erased) for security 
purposes, the executive branch simultaneously discloses information and 
quite explicitly and clearly keeps it secret. The public can see the 
document, it just cannot see every word—or perhaps any word at all if 
the entire document or page has been redacted. An agency sometimes 
redacts a document that it is otherwise required to release under a legal 
 
 198. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 199. Dubose & Bernstein, supra note 144, at 15–16; Jane Mayer, Contract Sport: What Did the 
Vice-President Do for Halliburton?, New Yorker, Feb. 16, 2004, at 80. 
 200. See Jon Gold, The Facts Speak for Themselves, 911Truth.org (Sept. 25, 2008), 
http://www.911truth.org/article_for_printing.php?story=20090104025547844; Michael Kane, Crossing 
the Rubicon: Simplifying the Case Against Dick Cheney, FromTheWilderness.com (Jan. 18, 2005), 
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/011805_simplify_case.shtml. 
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mandate; alternatively, an agency may not have been obliged to release a 
redacted document but decided to declassify or make it public in an 
effort to meet public expectations or enhance public understanding of an 
issue. As a surgical removal of privileged information, redaction 
constitutes a compromise, a second-best alternative to complete secrecy 
that is better than nothing in this regard. But by making visible that 
which is kept secret, redaction reveals secrecy’s machinery in ways that 
the complete refusal to release a document does not. Paradoxically, 
redactions allow citizens to see precisely what they cannot know. 
This Part demonstrates that understanding redaction as selective but 
complete censorship proves to be only partially correct given the myriad 
ways in which redaction can fail. It begins with a discussion of how laws 
enable government to use redactions as a strategy to retain control over 
information, and then illustrates the ways that redaction has failed in 
recent high-profile cases. It ends by demonstrating how even redaction’s 
textual erasure still produces meaning. 
A. Information Control and Release in Redaction Law 
Government agencies redact information most frequently in 
response to FOIA requests and as part of the review process of certain 
employees’ publications. The Freedom of Information Act requires 
federal agencies to provide “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a 
record” of documents when they rely upon one of FOIA’s exemptions to 
deny a document request.201 Agencies must make their redactions explicit 
and obvious by indicating the amount of deleted information, the 
exemption that authorized the deletion, and, when possible, where in the 
document the deletion occurred.202 Courts occasionally play an active role 
in the redaction process.203 
The pre-publication review process that intelligence agencies use for 
the public writings of their current and former employees also results in 
 
 201. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. EPA, 731 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The 
‘segregability’ requirement applies to all documents and all exemptions in the FOIA.”). 
 202. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
 203. See, e.g., ACLU. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 738 F. Supp. 2d 93, 110–11 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(finding that the agency did not sufficiently support full redactions of e-mails and ordering the agency 
to “re-evaluate this document to ensure that only properly withheld information has been redacted 
and either make greater disclosure of the content of the e-mail to the plaintiff or provide a more 
detailed rationale” for withholding text). The fact that courts can inspect documents affected by 
agency redactions and of which an agency denied disclosure does not require them to do so. See Nat’l 
Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978). The D.C. Circuit in 
particular grants trial courts broad discretion to decide how and to what extent they will conduct in 
camera review. See Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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the disclosure of redacted documents.204 The Central Intelligence Agency 
(the “CIA” or the “Agency”) has long required employees to sign secrecy 
agreements as a condition of employment.205 These agreements include 
provisions that require the employees to submit written manuscripts that 
they plan to publish prior to publication.206 The CIA delegates manuscript 
review to its Publications Review Board (“PRB”), which must respond to 
the author within thirty days with proposed deletions.207 Although the 
PRB’s approach has varied over time as different agency directors use 
their discretion to set their secrecy policy preferences,208 some authors and 
critics of the CIA have argued that the PRB over-redacts information, 
especially when it supports criticism of CIA performance and policy.209 
Frustrated employees have challenged agency efforts to enforce the 
secrecy agreements on First Amendment grounds,210 as well as on the 
grounds that the redacted information is in fact not classified,211 or had 
 
 204. See generally John Hollister Hedley, Secrets, Free Speech, and Fig Leaves, 41 Stud. Intel. 75, 
77-78, 83 n.1 (1998), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol41no5/pdf/v41i5a04p.pdf (describing CIA’s pre-publication review process). 
 205. Michael L. Charlson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Expanding Prepublication Review of 
Government Employees’ Speech, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 962 (1984) 
 206. See, e.g., Berntsen v. CIA, 618 F. Supp. 2d 27, 28 (D.D.C. 2009) (reproducing a pre-
publication review provision from an employment contract). 
 207. See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 934 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Marchetti, 
466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972). The PRB often holds manuscripts beyond the deadline. See 
A. John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel? 2 J. Nat’l. 
Sec. L. & Pol’y 201, 239 n.121 (2008); see, e.g., Jason Vest, Ex-CIA Officer Heads to Court for Second 
Time over Proposed Book, Gov. Exec. (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1005/ 
101305v1.htm (describing author’s frustration when PRB took ninety-eight days to return manuscript 
with a long list of redactions). See generally Richard Willing, Spy Books Strain CIA Review Board, 
USA Today (Apr. 30, 2007, 9:38 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-04-29-spy-
books_N.htm (noting that in the period between 2000 and 2007, the number of manuscripts increased 
four-fold, and between 1980 and 2007, it has increased twelve-fold). 
 208. Radsan, supra note 207, at 241–42; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, CIA Crackdown Seeks to 
Tighten Agency’s Secrecy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2006, at A1. 
 209. See Scott Shane, C.I.A. Fighting Memoir of 9/11 By F.B.I. Agent, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2011, at 
A1 (reporting complaints from a former Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) agent about CIA 
redactions to his manuscript); Laura Miller, Censored by the CIA: A 23-Year-Old Veteran of the 
Agency Reveals How the Vetting Process is Used to Stifle Critics of the War, Salon (Aug. 30, 2011, 
5:31 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/08/31/censored_by_cia (interviewing former CIA agent 
complaining about intimidation in the PRB review process); Dana Priest, Suing Over the CIA’s Red 
Pen; Retired Operative Says Agency Unfairly Edited His Book, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 2006, at A15 
(recounting a former CIA agent’s threat from the CIA’s executive director that the agency would 
“‘redact the [expletive] out of your book’” because of its criticism of the CIA). 
 210. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (upholding the CIA’s pre-publication 
review process as a “reasonable means” of restricting an employee’s ability to speak not only because 
of the voluntary nature of the secrecy agreement that its employees sign, but also due to the agency’s 
“compelling interest” in protecting classified intelligence information essential to national security). 
 211. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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been officially disclosed previously,212 or had been properly classified213—
but such challenges do not often prevail. 
Redaction’s legal authorities thus assume the following: disclosure 
and secrecy are appropriate, within reason. The two can be reconciled 
through an agency’s precise control of information, down to the page, line, 
and word whose redaction will keep secret dangerous content. Wielding its 
black pen or eraser, the government can limit disclosure’s ill effects. 
B. How Redaction Fails 
Redaction can fail in a variety of ways, however. The information that 
it tries to suppress might already be in the public domain.214 The 
information can also subsequently leak out or can be inferred from the 
document or the context in which the redaction appears.215 The redactions 
might not successfully suppress information due to bureaucratic conflict 
and sometimes technical errors.216 Agencies cannot extend the redaction 
that they are authorized to make to documents outside their control. This 
Subpart illustrates that despite its status as an explicit form of 
information control, redaction often reveals secrecy’s malfunction. 
Redaction’s failure thus illustrates the difficulty of maintaining secrecy 
and questions the effort to protect information. 
Consider first the redactions to former CIA agent Valerie Plame 
Wilson’s best selling memoirs.217 Wilson’s career had ended when 
unauthorized leaks to news agencies by members of the Bush 
 
 212. Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 213. Stillman v. CIA, 319 F.3d 546, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 214. See infra notes 276–285 (providing examples). 
 215. For example, the New York Times obtained an un-redacted copy of an internal government history 
of U.S. efforts to capture Nazis after World War II; the copy revealed significant amounts of information that 
the Justice Department had redacted in a version it released in response to FOIA litigation. See Eric 
Lichtblau, Secret Papers Detail U.S. Aid for Ex-Nazis, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2010, at A1. 
 216. This can happen with commercial software programs. See Nat’l Sec. Agency, Redaction of 
PDF Files Using Adobe Acrobat Professional X at 1; Jaikumar Vijayan, Analysis: TSA Document 
Release Show Pitfalls of Electronic Redaction, Computerworld (Dec. 11, 2009, 7:18 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9142141/Analysis_TSA_document_release_show_pitfalls_of_
electronic_redaction. The problem predates electronic files and redaction; when redaction was on 
paper, it was sometimes possible to peer past the black mark at the underlying text. See Scott Shane, 
Spies Do a Huge Volume of Work in Invisible Ink, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2007, at A4. The problem is 
not peculiar to American government. See, e.g., Dan Levine & Carlyn Kolker, Exclusive: Apple versus 
Samsung Ruling Divulges Secret Details, Reuters, Dec. 6, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/12/06/us-apple-samsung-ruling-idUSTRE7B425D20111206 (describing court order in 
private litigation that failed to redact proprietary information); David Millward & Thomas Harding, 
Secrets Put on Internet in Whitehall Blunders, Telegraph (Apr. 17, 2011, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8457506/Secrets-put-on-internet-in-Whitehall-
blunders.html (reporting that secrets about British nuclear submarines posted online in redacted 
documents could be revealed by copying and pasting them in new documents). 
 217. See generally Valerie Plame Wilson, Fair Game (2007). 
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administration identified her as a covert agent in an effort to disparage 
her husband, a former diplomat who publicly challenged evidence 
proffered by the administration of Saddam Hussein’s efforts to build 
weapons of mass destruction.218 The resulting scandal paradoxically 
transformed Valerie Plame Wilson from secret spy to public celebrity, 
and she sold the rights to her memoirs to a major publishing house for 
$2.5 million.219 Upon reviewing her manuscript prior to publication, the 
CIA’s PRB required significant redactions, including of factual 
information about Wilson’s career that had been published in popular 
news accounts and in an unclassified letter from a CIA official that was 
published in the Congressional Record.220 After losing her administrative 
and legal appeals of the redactions,221 Wilson and her publisher decided 
to release the book with large portions of the text hidden behind dull 
grey lines that represented the censored material. The book’s main text 
thus has whole pages of redactions, as well as pages that combine visible 
text and single-word or line-by-line redactions. Two chapter titles are 
blacked out. Parts of Wilson’s life story, including her husband’s 
courtship of her and parts of her account of the PRB process itself, are so 
thoroughly edited as to be almost incomprehensible.222 The book’s 
redactions stand in protest of a secrecy policy to which Wilson objected, 
forcing the reader to make sense of an explicitly censored text. They 
make plain that Wilson had lost control of the telling of her own life. 
But the book also demonstrates the absurdity and imperfections of 
the government’s censorship efforts. Much of the content that the CIA 
had forbidden Wilson to publish appears in an afterword written by 
Laura Rozen, a foreign policy and intelligence reporter who relied for 
her nearly one-hundred-page contribution on open source materials and 
personal interviews of others who knew Wilson.223 The CIA could not 
limit Rozen’s access to her sources, and it had no mechanism to censor 
her use of them in the afterword. For example, one of the most 
significant pieces of information redacted from the main text was the 
country where Wilson worked undercover and any details that would 
 
 218. See Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 2008); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith 
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Gellman, supra note 134, at 360–64. 
 219. Motoko Rich, Valerie Plame Gets Book Deal, N.Y. Times (May 5, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/05/books/05cnd-plame.html. 
 220. Wilson gives a full account of the PRB process in the memoir. See Wilson, supra note 217, at 
264–81. 
 221. See Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 196 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing Wilson’s claims that because 
the CIA’s redactions included information in the public record, the redactions violated the First 
Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 222. Wilson, supra note 217, at 270–73. 
 223. See Laura Rozen, Afterword to Wilson, Fair Game, supra note 217, at 307–89; see also 
Wilson, Fair Game, supra note 217, at ix (explaining Rozen’s afterword). 
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allow a reader to identify the country; indeed, chapters 2 and 3, which 
cover her early years in the agency, are among the most heavily redacted. 
As we learn in Rozen’s afterword, however, Wilson spent six years 
undercover in Greece, a fact that was known to Wilson’s family 
(although they did not know that she worked for the CIA at that time), 
and one that had been widely reported in the news.224 The reader can 
learn from Rozen’s afterword that the information about how she met 
and ultimately married her husband had appeared in Joseph Wilson’s 
memoir, which had been published three years earlier.225 Fair Game also 
included an appendix that reproduces public documents, including 
correspondence between the CIA’s PRB and her attorneys, court filings, 
and entries from the Congressional Record that included information 
Wilson could not get past the PRB’s censors.226 The documents provide 
further details about Wilson’s service in the CIA and the PRB review 
process that were redacted in her portion of the memoirs. Readers 
thereby have access to much of the information that the agency had 
sought to redact.227 
Bureaucratic indifference and conflict rather than absurdly excessive 
censorship caused another recent redaction failure. Operation Dark Heart, 
Anthony Shaffer’s memoir of his experiences as a Defense Intelligence 
Agency (“DIA”) officer in the war in Afghanistan, initially went to press 
without significant censorship after prepublication review by the Army.228 
As the book was set to be released, however, the DIA and other 
intelligence agencies sought to stop its publication, asserting that it 
contained classified information, the release of which could be harmful 
to national security. The Pentagon purchased and destroyed ten thousand 
printed copies of the book’s original edition, while the book’s publisher 
arranged to publish a second edition with the newly required redactions.229 
The censorship failed, however, because a limited number of 
advance copies of the original edition were already in circulation.230 
Those with both copies could identify precisely what the DIA had 
redacted. An investigative news website posted numerous pages from 
both editions for a side-by-side comparison, revealing many of the 
 
 224. See id. at 319–31. 
 225. Id. at 351–52; Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth 239–43 (2004). 
 226. See Wilson, supra note 217, at 392–402. 
 227. See Janet Maslin, Her Identity Revealed, Her Story Expurgated, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2007, at 
E1 (book review describing dispute with CIA, and characterizing the afterword as “fill[ing] in some of 
the gaps” created by the redactions). 
 228. Scott Shane, Pentagon Tries to Corner Book to Keep Secrets, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2010, at A16. 
 229. Scott Shane, In Censored Book’s Reprint, Pentagon Redacts Some Not-So-Secret Secrets, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 18, 2010, at A9. 
 230. Id. 
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classified “secrets” that the DIA hoped to hide.231 By January 2013, the 
Department of Defense had partially reversed course again, declaring that 
many of the redactions had subsequently been declassified while retaining 
classification for many of the others.232 
As with the Wilson memoir, the state could not successfully keep 
everything it sought to suppress secret because some of it had already 
become public. In its afterword and appendix, Fair Game makes this 
explicit by revealing some of the redacted information. Similarly, a 
reader who knows or stumbles upon the story behind Operation Dark 
Heart can more directly and literally find the unredacted text online. 
These are exceptional cases—though not unique ones.233 They reveal the 
difficulties that the state confronts as it complies with formal statutory and 
constitutional limitations on secrecy, and as it attempts to overcome the 
informal checks on secrecy—official and unofficial leaks, intrepid 
investigative reporting, the activities of political opponents, and 
bureaucratic conflict and bungling. 
C. Redaction’s Meaning 
Redaction can fail not only to keep the actual text hidden under the 
redactions from the public—but also to stop the public from reading, and 
reading into, the covering lines themselves, which themselves produce 
meaning. As the anthropologist Michael Powell has written, redaction 
“transforms the way we read these documents, sparking curiosity and 
often stirring skeptical, critical, and even cynical readings.”234 Few 
readers will share Valerie Wilson’s personal sense of betrayal and 
outrage at the CIA’s PRB process of Fair Game, but many will wonder at 
the CIA’s motivations and rationality in its extraordinary efforts to 
redact information that was readily available. Readers are also likely to 
speculate, whether in an informed or uninformed manner, about what 
lies under the black marks and about the government’s motivations in 
 
 231. See Redacted and Unredacted Side-by-Side of ‘Operation Dark Heart’, ProPublica, 
http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/redacted-and-unredacted-side-by-side-of-operation-dark-
heart; see also Anthony Shaffer, Index to Operation Dark Heart, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2010/09/dark-index.pdf (providing a side-by-side comparison of redacted 
and unredacted versions of the book’s index). 
 232. See Steven Aftergood, Pentagon Relaxes Censorship of Afghan War Memoir, Secrecy News 
(Jan. 24, 2013, 1:44 P.M.), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2013/01/dark_heart_declass.html. 
 233. See, e.g., WikiLeaks Diplomatic Cables FOIA Documents, Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
http://www.aclu.org/wikileaks-diplomatic-cables-foia-documents (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (comparing 
redacted diplomatic cables obtained by FOIA with unredacted documents obtained by WikiLeaks, 
claiming that the latter show “the government’s selective and self-serving decisions to withhold 
information” via redaction). 
 234. Michael G. Powell,  xxxxx Out: Our Cultural Romance with Redacted Documents, Believer 
Mag., June 2010, at 23, 24. 
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redacting the text. Sometimes informed speculation will prove accurate;235 
sometimes it will lead the public to imagine the worst, perhaps by 
assuming the existence of a conspiracy or official incompetence where 
neither existed—or where the state in fact has done something equally, 
though differently, culpable.236 Even when redaction successfully censors 
information, it cannot obstruct the process of meaning-production about 
the text that it hides. 
Black blots on a document divorced from consideration of the 
content that they hide can also create meaning separate from the hidden 
content, as contemporary artists have shown by playing with redaction’s 
signification in their work. In his FBI Files series (2000–02), the painter 
Arnold Mesches appropriated documents that he obtained from the 
investigatory files the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) had 
produced in their surveillance of his political activities in the 1950s and 
1960s.237 Intermixing the documents into collages with paintings of 
arresting images from the culture and politics of the era, his works 
comment on the state that surveilled and infiltrated his life. The collages 
find beauty in the detritus of official action and satirize the secret, 
paranoid world in which J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI thrived. Similarly, Jenny 
Holzer’s recent series Redaction Paintings painstakingly reproduce, in oil 
paint on linen and in larger size than the original paper, declassified, 
redacted documents about detainee abuse obtained through FOIA 
requests filed by the ACLU.238 In a 2004 exhibition, Holzer projected 
onto the faces of buildings in the German city of Bregenz redacted 
documents from the Bush administration that explained and authorized 
the Global War on Terror.239 Each set of visual works demonstrates how 
redactions perform a literal but partial censorship alongside disclosure, 
while they allow the redactions’ black marks and blots to reveal the 
invisible but programmatic physical violence that the documents 
record.240 Mesches described the inspiration provided by “the sheer 
aesthetic beauty of the [redacted] pages themselves—the bold, black, 
slashing, eradicating strokes” that look like artistic renderings made by 
the menacing bureaucratic police apparatus.241 In reproducing redacted 
documents as art, he and Holzer reveal redactions’ fruitful censorship, 
which in their work comes to represent the enormity of the security state 
 
 235. See infra Part V.B.2 (describing historians’ efforts to infer the meaning of redactions). 
 236. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 237. See generally Arnold Mesches, The FBI Files, 15 Pub. Culture 287 (2003). 
 238. See generally Jenny Holzer, Redaction Paintings (2006). 
 239. See Jenny Holzer et al., Truth Before Power (2004). 
 240. Joseph Slaughter, Vanishing Points: When Narrative Is Not Simply There, 9 J. Hum. Rts. 207, 
211 (2010). 
 241. Mesches, supra note 237, at 292. 
Fenster_21 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:39 PM 
352 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:309 
 
that the Cold War and post-9/11 reaction produced, as well as the 
tremendous efforts the security state takes to keep itself secret. 
The same proves true in published texts that reproduce or create 
redactions. Wilson’s Fair Game is not the only book that has used 
extensive black marks to comment on state censorship. Former CIA 
agent Joseph Weisberg’s 2007 novel An Ordinary Spy, which narrates the 
story of an incompetent, conscience-wracked American spy, includes 
almost as many redactions as Wilson’s Fair Game, but unlike the latter, 
Weisberg redacted his own text to heighten the book’s authenticity.242 
According to one account, the book’s black bars “concealed the names of 
countries, the particulars of tradecraft and other details that might be 
classified information, if the story were true.”243 But the novel was 
fabricated; Weisberg removed most of the material to which the PRB 
would have objected, and the board redacted only a little more than what 
Weisberg had not himself redacted. Moreover, as a novelist, Weisberg 
could have simply created unobjectionable material to replace that which 
the PRB redacted.244 Instead, he seemed to hope that redaction would 
increase the reader’s pleasure and sense of the novel’s accurate portrayal 
of the spy’s daily life, even as it blacked the details of that life out. 
Mesches and Holzer, who are more critical of the documents they 
reproduce than Weisberg, make use of blots and black lines that signify 
as well as censor. For all three, redactions create meaning even as they 
attempt to control information. As this Part has illustrated and the next 
will further show, redaction often fails to achieve its goal. 
V.  “Secret History”: The Struggle to Control Information About 
Covert Operations 
By definition, covert state actions are secret. A means by which the 
President and intelligence community attempt to change the course of 
history without leaving any historical traces, they are designed and 
executed in order to be the most unknown of the unknowns. The issue of 
whether the state should make later disclosures of their existence and 
details generates fierce debate between historians and members of the 
intelligence community.245 As the next Subpart explains, the government 
 
 242. See Alex Beam, Espionage realist, Yale Alumni Mag., Sept./Oct. 2011, at 43, 44 (characterizing 
the redactions as a “major conceit” of the novel and noting that he made most of them). 
 243. Motoko Rich, From Undercover to Between the Covers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2007, at B9 
(emphasis added). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See, e.g., Warren F. Kimball, Openness and the CIA, 44 Stud. Intel. 63 (2001) (arguing for 
disclosure of past covert actions from the perspective of a diplomatic historian); N. Richard Kinsman, 
Openness and the Future of the Clandestine Service, 44 Stud. Intel. 55 (2001) (arguing against 
disclosure from the perspective of a retired CIA official). 
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has committed itself to disclose some of its past covert activities.246 But 
these efforts to make historical documents available have faced formal 
and informal resistance through law and bureaucratic recalcitrance that 
protect some degree of secrecy about the official past. After introducing 
the various means by which the federal government attempts to keep 
some of its historical secrets while making others public, this Part offers a 
case study of the complex struggle that the executive branch and 
especially the intelligence community have undertaken to keep secret the 
United States’ covert role in directing the 1954 coup in Guatemala, a key 
moment in American Cold War history. This “secret history” reveals the 
difficulty and even implausibility of controlling information about past 
covert actions. 
A. Public Secrets and Public History Law 
The United States has long tried, for different reasons and to varied 
effect, to make public its secret history. The State Department has 
published the Foreign Relations of the United States (“FRUS”) series, an 
official documentary record of foreign policy decisions and diplomatic 
activity,247 more or less continuously since 1861. The FRUS carries on a 
longstanding tradition of State Department documentary reports to 
Congress that dates back to the early Republic.248 Since World War II, 
however, the FRUS has faced a more complicated political environment, 
while at the same time it has needed to document America’s greatly 
changed geo-political position and its vastly larger State and Defense 
Departments and intelligence services. This has resulted in a FRUS 
publication process fraught with political and bureaucratic conflict.249 To 
address these concerns, the State Department formed a permanent 
advisory committee composed of academic historians in 1957,250 and, more 
recently, Congress enacted legislation requiring the State Department to 
engage more thoroughly with academic historians and to declassify 
 
 246. The post-Watergate period saw the most extensive disclosures of American covert actions. 
See generally Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate 
Investigations of the CIA and FBI (1996). 
 247. 22 U.S.C. § 4351(a) (2012). 
 248. Recent histories of the Foreign Relations of the United States series (“FRUS”) and the State 
Department’s Office of the Historian are Kristin L. Ahlberg, Building a Model Public History Program: 
The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State, 30 Pub. Historian 9 (2008); Joshua Botts, 
FRUS at 150, Office of the Historian, Dep’t of State (2011), http://www.archives.gov.il/ 
NR/rdonlyres/18E1895D-A15E-405F-B4EE-91FE56C7CF65/0/FRUS150Nov29.pdf (reprinting an essay 
presented at the 11th International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents). 
 249. See Botts, supra note 248, at 15–27 (describing conflicts over FRUS during the Cold War). 
 250. See Richard W. Leopold, The Foreign Relations Series: A Centennial Estimate, 49 Miss. Valley 
Hist. Rev. 595, 607–09 (1963); Page Putnam Miller, We Can’t Yet Read Our Own Mail: Access to the 
Records of the Department of State, in A Culture of Secrecy 189–94 (Athan G. Theoharis ed., 1998). 
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documents on a scheduled basis.251 Congress’ interest in FRUS was itself 
part of broader legislative efforts to advance the declassification of 
documents concerning particularly controversial historical events.252 
Another statute, the Presidential Records Act (the “PRA”),253 
clarified an uneven and informal practice of making the papers of a 
departing President publicly available.254 Enacted at the tail end of the 
post-Watergate period of open government statutes, the PRA addressed 
the issue that arose from former President Nixon’s efforts to control the 
documents from his presidency, when it became clear both that former 
presidents could not be trusted to allow public access to their historical 
papers and that there was wide public demand for such access.255 The 
statute allows for public access to presidential records through the FOIA 
beginning five years after the end of the administration, but allows the 
President to invoke as many as six specific restrictions to public access 
for up to twelve years.256 
These efforts to open the historical record have faced significant 
resistance. Every struggle over the receding past takes place in the 
shadow both of an underlying constitutional conflict over presidential 
privilege,257 and of the bureaucratic barriers that the classification system 
creates.258 The FRUS volumes have come more slowly and sporadically as 
a result of such battles, especially due to long delays in declassifying 
documents.259 At the same time, the PRA does not provide unfettered 
access to the historical record. Presidential records continue to fall within 
 
 251. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-138, § 198, 105 Stat. 647, 685-691 (1991) 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 4351–57); Botts, supra note 248, at 29–31; see Philip G. Schrag, Working 
Papers as Federal Records: The Need for New Legislation to Preserve the History of National Policy, 
46 Admin. L. Rev. 95, 139 n.248 (1994). 
 252. See, e.g., Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 1859 (1998); 
President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-526, 
106 Stat. 3443 (1992). 
 253. Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as amended at 
44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2000)). 
 254. On the history of presidential papers before the PRA, see Jonathan Turley, Presidential 
Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of 
Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 651, 657–66 (2003) 
 255. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 445–46 n.8, 483–84 (1977) (upholding against 
constitutional challenge a pre-PRA statute focused solely on President Nixon’s records). 
 256. 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (2012). 
 257. See, e.g., George Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1992 and 1993 (Oct. 28, 1991), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=20152 
(explicitly declaring the President’s constitutional prerogative over diplomatic information statement 
upon signing the bill authorizing the FRUS). 
 258. Anne Van Camp, Trying to Write “Comprehensive and Accurate” History of the Foreign 
Relations of the United States: An Archival Perspective, in Archives and the Public Good, supra note 
68, at 229, 241. (noting the key role of the State Department and other agencies in delaying the 
issuance of FRUS volumes). 
 259. Botts, supra note 248, at 30–31. 
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FOIA’s exceptions even after the twelve-year period that allows former 
presidents to place additional restrictions on public access.260 Presidential 
administrations also vary in the extent of their willingness to comply with 
the statute’s spirit and letter.261 The legal and bureaucratic machinery of 
secrecy can, at least in theory, continue to hide the state’s covert actions. 
B. Guatemala’s Secret History 
As in the other case studies in this Article, however, the executive 
branch’s ability to exercise control over the flow of information by 
overriding formal legislative efforts to open archives is itself frequently 
undercut by informal means. In the case of information about past 
American covert operations—among the most controversial and 
secretive acts in which the nation’s intelligence community, diplomatic 
corps, and military engage—informal disclosure occurs because the 
operations inevitably have real-world effects that leave a public record 
and create a public memory where the operation took place. 
The struggle over information about American involvement in 
Guatemalan history perfectly illustrates this dynamic. The CIA’s covert 
operation resulting in the 1954 coup that deposed the popularly elected 
Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz became the model for many 
similar secret interventions that followed, including the failed Bay of Pigs 
invasion in Cuba in 1961, and the operation had long-term devastating 
effects on Guatemala’s political and social stability.262 Although direct 
and extensive American involvement in the coup was widely recognized 
throughout Latin America and Europe at the time and subsequently,263 
the Eisenhower administration portrayed the coup as a popular 
 
 260. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(1) (2012). On FOIA’s exceptions, see supra notes 48–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 261. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. 13233 (2001), 44 USC § 2204 (2012) (printing 
George W. Bush executive order allowing former presidents to withhold records as privileged after the 
twelve year moratorium with the concurrence of the incumbent President), with Exec. Order 
No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,669 (Jan. 26, 2009) (publishing Obama’s revocation of Bush’s order). See 
generally Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and Executive Privilege, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 301, 352 
(2009); Marcy Lynn Karin, Note, Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind: How Executive Order 13,233 
Expands Executive Privilege While Simultaneously Preventing Access to Presidential Records, 55 Stan. 
L. Rev. 529, 548–52 (2002). 
 262. See Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions ix–x (2008); 
Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala 186–201 (1982); John H. Coatsworth, Introduction to 
Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in 
Guatemala xv (2005). American involvement, and the CIA’s denial of its own involvement in 
atrocities in Guatemala and efforts to cover it up, continued into the Clinton administration. See 
Richard A. Nuccio, Foreword to the 1999 Edition of Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer, Bitter 
Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala xxii–xxvi (1999). 
 263. See Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in 
Guatemala, 1952–1954 at 111–13, 119 (1999). 
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Guatemalan uprising and, with the complicity of U.S. news editors and 
publishers, kept the CIA’s role relatively secret from the American 
public.264 The coup continues to float in a kind of historical twilight, at 
once well-known in Latin America and among historians and Americans 
well-versed in Central American history, but shrouded in the 
impenetrable mystery that clings to controversial CIA Cold War covert 
operations. Numerous monographs on Guatemalan history, memoirs 
from coup participants, and books that treat covert American 
interventions in the post-war era more broadly have brought the 
American role in sponsoring and assisting the coup to at least some 
light.265 Nevertheless, several historians have complained that the event’s 
details have been lost or remain locked inside government archives.266 
Historians’ work has been made more difficult because the CIA’s 
files remained off-limits to researchers into the 1990s,267 not least because 
a 1983 FRUS volume, putatively concerning Guatemala, included no 
documents suggesting CIA involvement in the coup.268 In 1992, however, 
as part of an “openness” initiative following the Soviet Union’s 
collapse,269 the CIA commissioned Nick Cullather, a recently-minted 
history Ph.D. and new member of the agency’s History Staff, to use full 
access to the Agency’s classified files to write an insider history of the 
CIA’s role in the 1954 coup. The Agency intended the resulting account 
to serve as a training manual for future covert operatives rather than as a 
full or official account of the operation; nevertheless, the Agency 
planned ultimately to release Cullather’s text to the public, along with 
some of the documents on which Cullather relied.270 The openness 
proved temporary, however, and Cullather’s report, completed in 1993, 
remained classified until it was declassified and deposited in the National 
 
 264. Immerman, supra note 262, at 4–5; Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra note 262, at 153–56 (2005). 
For an account of how the CIA and State Department persuaded the New York Times to stop 
reporting on the coup in order to keep the CIA’s involvement from Americans, see Harrison E. 
Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor 478–83 (1980). 
 265. See Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United 
States 1944–1954 (1991); E. Howard Hunt & Greg Aunapu, American Spy 59–84 (2007); Immerman, 
supra note 262; David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch 34–54 (1977); Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra 
note 262. 
 266. Gleijeses, supra note 265, at 4; Coatsworth, supra note 262, at xi. 
 267. One of the earliest critical histories of United States’ involvement in the 1954 coup relied 
heavily on documents received via the FOIA—although, notably, not from the CIA, which refused to 
make disclosures under FOIA. See Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra note 262, at xxxvii (2005). 
 268. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, Office of the Historian, 
Dep’t of State (2003), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat. 
 269. See James X. Dempsey, The CIA and Secrecy, in A Culture of Secrecy, supra note 250, at 
53–55 (discussing the CIA’s interest in openness in the early 1990s). 
 270. Cullather, supra note 263, at vii–ix, xiv. 
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Archives in 1997.271 Stanford University Press subsequently published it 
in 1999 with the title Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its 
Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954, retaining the same redactions the 
CIA had made upon the manuscript’s declassification.272 
In theory, Secret History could constitute a milestone text in the 
disclosure of American Cold War secrets—an institutional CIA history 
of a key covert operation that had proved enormously influential, not 
only in Guatemala, but throughout the Western Hemisphere, while it has 
remained largely unknown to most Americans. Through no fault of 
Cullather, however, it did not. The declassified version of his manuscript 
was extensively redacted, with not only names but also parts of the 
operation removed—including, ironically, a passage on how the 
Eisenhower administration kept news of the CIA’s involvement in the 
coup secret from Americans.273 The scope of Cullather’s assigned project 
did not lend itself to serving as a comprehensive history anyway, and the 
documentary release that the CIA originally stated would accompany 
Cullather’s report included a limited amount of materials.274 Secret 
History only serves as a partial disclosure, then, because the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the clandestine service appears to have proven capable of 
retaining history’s secrets long after the Guatemala coup it engineered. 
Indeed, the historic record remains contested regarding details, 
personal identities, and especially the larger historiographical questions 
regarding American motives and the relative moral purity of the nation’s 
intent.275 Was the United States motivated by the desire to protect the 
United Fruit Company, a powerful American corporation, from 
nationalization and land reform?276 Or to save Guatemala from communist 
and especially Soviet influence?277 Or simply to protect national, and 
perhaps neo-colonial, American interests?278 These questions remain 
“secret,” in the sense that answers, if they exist, may lie buried in some file 
cabinet in CIA headquarters. Having incrementally increased the 
historical record, Cullather’s account provided confirmation about some 
aspects of existing historical hypotheses but could not rule out competing 
 
 271. Nicholas Cullather, Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala 1952–
1954 (1994). 
 272. Cullather, supra note 263, at iii–xv, xvii. 
 273. Id. at 119. See generally Robert Shaffer, The 1954 Coup in Guatemala and the Teaching of 
U.S. Foreign Relations, Passport (2004), available at http://www.shafr.org/old/teaching/Shaffer1.pdf. 
 274. Cullather, supra note 263, at xiv–xv; Press Release, Ctr. for the Study of Intelligence, 
Release of Records on 1952–54 Guatemala Covert Actions (May 23, 1997) (on file with Author). 
 275. See Richard H. Immerman, Book Review, 106 Am. Hist. Rev. 605, 605 (2001) (reviewing 
Cullather, supra note 263). 
 276. See Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra note 262, at 106 (2005). 
 277. See Immerman, supra note 262, at 68, 82. 
 278. See Gleijeses, supra note 265, at 7. 
Fenster_21 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:39 PM 
358 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:309 
 
ones or lay bare the full truth.279 Viewed this way, the secrecy apparatus 
won—some of the operational specifics and the larger motivations of the 
Guatemala coup remain as obscure today as they were in the coup’s 
immediate aftermath.280 
But this view of Secret History and the Guatemala coup is incomplete 
for two reasons, each of which should be familiar by this point in the 
Article. Despite the CIA’s broad use of its classification authority, general 
and specific information about American involvement was immediately 
available and known within Guatemala281 and throughout Western 
Europe,282 and it became more widely known in the United States through 
incidental disclosures and responses to FOIA requests beginning in the 
1970s.283 The intervening decades have seen the disclosure of more 
information. In 2003, nearly fifty years after the coup, the State 
Department issued a FRUS volume with a more expansive collection of 
documents about the coup, and the CIA has made thousands of 
documents (many of them redacted) available on its website.284 Additional 
documents had previously come to light during Guatemala’s truth and 
reconciliation process, in aid of which the Clinton administration 
declassified thousands of documents and the National Security Archive 
produced a documentary history tracing American involvement in 
Guatemala from the coup through the 1990s.285 Formal and informal 
mechanisms of information disclosure and circulation have curtailed the 
secrecy that elements of the state continue to try to impose. 
Secret History has therefore become part of the broader unveiling of 
the secret history of the U.S. role in Guatemala’s 1954 coup, some of 
which has been the consequence of official state action. Much of the 
CIA’s prized secret history was in fact not secret.286 This is not to defend 
the CIA’s effort to keep secrets, nor is it to deny the value of disclosure 
 
 279. See generally Stephen M. Streeter, Interpreting the U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, 
Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives, 34 Hist. Tchr. 61 (2000). 
 280. See Immerman, supra note 275 (complaining of the CIA’s “behavior” in refusing to release 
unredacted versions of classified documents that could conceivably resolve significant historical 
disputes). 
 281. See Gleijeses, supra note 265, at 3–7. 
 282. See Sharon I. Meers, The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 
1954 Coup in Guatemala, 16 Diplomatic Hist. 409, 419, 422–23 (1992). 
 283. Cullather, supra note 263, at 119–23; Schlesinger & Kinzer, supra note 262, at ix–xi, xxxvii–
viii (2005). 
 284. See Guatemala, Cent. Intelligence Agency, http://www.foia.cia.gov/guatemala.asp; see also 
Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA 562 (2007); Foreign Relations of the United 
States, supra note 268. 
 285. See Nat’l Security Archive, Death Squads, Guerrilla War, Covert Operations, and 
Genocide: Guatemala and the United States, 1954–1999 (Guatemala and the U.S.) (2000); 
William Clinton, Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion on Peace Efforts in Guatemala City, March 10, 
1999, in 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton 340 (1999). 
 286. See Immerman, supra note 275. 
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and the more complete picture that further access to documents can 
bring. The CIA’s resistance to making the historical record of its 
operations available to the public within a reasonable period of time is 
inexcusable. But my argument has been that secrecy proves much more 
difficult to maintain than its proponents assume. The CIA could only 
exert its full control over its own secret history, not the history to which 
the public gained access through other sources and authorities. At the 
same time, its secrecy merely increased the CIA’s mythological status in 
the United States as a preeminent tool of American foreign policy, and 
its status elsewhere as a representative of American imperialism.287 If 
most Americans remain ignorant of their nation’s sordid history in 
Guatemala, the cause is as much ideological as it is the public’s difficulty 
in obtaining information about it.288 
In the second edition of Secret History, published in 2006, Cullather 
suggests a second way that secrecy has proven implausible. In explaining 
his decision to keep the original redactions imposed by the CIA 
untouched, even though he could have inserted them with information 
gleaned from open sources, Cullather wrote: 
I have received more compliments on the eloquence of the gaps than 
on any of the legible passages. Readers have found they can check 
their speculations for fit, and search the blank spaces for clues on the 
aspects of the operation that the agency, even after 50 years, prefers to 
cloak in “plausible deniability.289 
Redactions might impose secrecy, Cullather’s readers told him, but 
they do not foreclose the effort—informed by other sources—to find the 
hidden meaning that the state has tried to conceal. “Eloquence” suggests 
that the empty spaces speak both of the missing content and of what 
those empty spaces say about the state that has removed their content.290 
Secrecy law and practice can render history “secret,” but it cannot fully 
control historical information, practice, and knowledge.291 It may keep 
 
 287. On the CIA’s mythological status both before and after the mid-1970s disclosure of the 
checkered history of its covert operations, see Olmsted, supra note 246, at 13–15, 186–89. 
 288. See Timothy Melley, The Covert Sphere 13 (2012). 
 289. Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in 
Guatemala ix (2d ed. 2006). 
 290. The CIA’s redactions of Cullather’s original manuscript literally erased text and left square 
brackets surrounding empty space; the university press edition repeated this technique. 
 291. The Guatemala case is not unique. After the State Department refused to allow 
declassification of certain documents related to British Guyana, New York Times journalist Tim 
Weiner discovered the nature of the classified materials by using open source materials not subject to 
classification. His investigation revealed the existence of an American covert operation, ordered by 
President Kennedy, to unseat the nation’s democratically elected leader. See Tim Weiner, A Kennedy-
C.I.A. Plot Returns to Haunt Clinton, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1994, at A10; see also Colin A. Palmer, 
Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power 246–69 (2010); Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in 
British Guiana: A Cold War Story 151–73 (2005); see Weiner, supra note 284, at 191–92, 591–92 
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parts of the state veiled, but it reveals the state’s efforts to veil itself—
and in the process reveals the United States’ antidemocratic tendencies. 
Conclusion 
Deep, long-lasting secrecy proves quite difficult to accomplish in 
practice. The formal legal limits on secrecy, as well as the informal means 
by which information flows out of the state, perform the crucial service of 
making the state more visible. We should not, however, mistake this 
movement of information for “transparency,” or even for a step towards 
a gloriously transparent state. As this Article has argued elsewhere, we 
can never achieve a perfectly visible government—and, in fact, we would 
not even want one if it were achievable.292 The concept of “transparency,” 
like the concept of “secrecy,” assumes the law’s ability to control 
information, an assumption belied by decades of frustrating experience 
with open government laws.293 Both concepts are implausible. 
This is no reason to despair. This Conclusion notes three implications 
of this implausibility for understanding and responding to government 
secrecy: (1) recognizing it as a political practice subject to political 
accountability, (2) conceding law’s limits as a means to control 
information, and (3) developing legal reforms that can hasten official 
disclosure. 
First, secrecy is paradoxically a very public issue, and one for which 
excessively secretive officials can be held politically accountable. As 
Cheney has himself noted, secrecy can not only fail, revealing the 
information it sought to hide, but can also be exposed and criticized as an 
undemocratic practice. In the “leaky city” of the nation’s capitol, Cheney 
wrote in an essay published three years after completion of the 
congressional investigation of Iran-Contra, no secret stays buried too 
long, and no president’s failed cover-ups go unpunished.294 Indeed, the 
Minority Report itself conceded that President Reagan was forced “to 
pay a stiff political price” not only for his appointees’ illegal actions in 
Iran-Contra, but also for their secrecy and attempted concealment of the 
program.295 The more secrets, and the deeper they are kept, the greater 
the risk that the President takes in keeping them—a risk that can prove 
 
(describing history that may have been secret in the United States, but was widely known in Guyana); 
See generally Festus Brotherson, Jr., The Foreign Policy of Guyana, 1970–1985: Forbes Burnham’s 
Search for Legitimacy, 31 J. Interamerican Stud. & World Aff. 9 (1989) (recounting this history in an 
academic article in 1989); Weiner, supra note 284 (quoting the president defeated in part through 
American intervention in the election, as stating that, “[e]verybody in Guyana knows what 
happened”). 
 292. Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 177, at 671–72. 
 293. Fenster, Opacity, supra note 28, at 914–19. 
 294. Cheney, supra note 148, at 116. 
 295. Iran-Contra Affair Report, supra note 148, at 452. 
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effective as an alternative to formal laws and legal proceedings in 
disciplining the executive branch. Such political costs cannot replace the 
formal legal limitations on secrecy that open government laws (not to 
mention, for criminal conspiracies and perjury, criminal laws) provide, 
but they serve as a mechanism by which the informal limits on secrecy 
can punish wrongdoers. 
This understanding of secrecy as a tool that has potential political 
costs suggests a more foundational informal check on information control. 
If “[t]he cover up is worse than the crime,”296 as the conventional wisdom 
teaches about Watergate, then secrecy appears to have an ethical 
dimension based upon a widely-shared, intuitive distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate secrecy. Although it lacks precise meaning, the 
concept of “transparency” functions as a nearly universal liberal 
democratic value, as is the notion that some secrets are too dangerous to a 
nation and society to warrant disclosure.297 Partisans might disagree about 
whether an individual instance of secrecy is excessive, but in doing so 
they must frame their arguments in widely-acknowledged and used 
terms. The NEPDG episode illustrates this well: NEPDG’s policy 
development process appeared absurdly secretive, as opponents and 
even members of the administration noted, and its secrecy provided the 
administration no political benefit and likely exacted political costs.298 
The more significant and pervasive secrecy that followed in the Bush 
administration’s post-9/11 anti-terrorism campaign, which the NEPDG 
episode launched and rehearsed, proved more temporarily effective at 
controlling information. But information about many of the 
administration’s programs ultimately leaked to the public over the course 
of the administration’s second term, from the torture of prisoners and 
detainees to the warrantless wiretaps of domestic communications.299 By 
the end of the Bush presidency, the administration—and especially 
Cheney—had become quite politically unpopular, at least partially 
because of the seemingly unethical nature of excessive secrecy. Barack 
Obama explicitly included open government as a platform in his 2008 
campaign, in part to contrast himself with the Bush-Cheney White 
House.300 The first implication of secrecy’s implausibility, then, is that it 
 
 296. David Johnston, Coverup: Watergate’s Toughest Lesson, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1998, at SR5 
(“Watergate bequeathed many things to history, including this famous cliche: The cover-up is worse 
than the crime. Politicians haven’t necessarily absorbed this lesson, but the legal system has.”); Frank 
Rich, We’re Not in Watergate Anymore, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2005, at SR12 (“[T]he most basic lesson of 
Watergate: [T]he cover-up is worse than the crime.”) 
 297. Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 177, at 624–26. 
 298. See discussion supra notes 188–194. 
 299. Baker, supra note 59. 
 300. For further discussion on Cheney and Bush’s unpopularity following the end of the Bush 
presidency, see Lydia Saad, Little Change in Negative Images of Bush and Cheney, Gallup Pol. 
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reveals the political nature of information control, and it demonstrates 
how politics serves both as a key motivation to use secrecy and as a 
crucial check on its overuse.301 It also reveals the necessity of these 
informal means of secrecy, and the importance of avoiding draconian 
leak laws302 and excessive prosecution of those who do leak.303 
A second implication of secrecy’s implausibility is the shift it 
suggests for the study of secrecy and transparency away from a binary, 
black-and-white conception of the state as either open and transparent or 
closed and opaque. As Part V illustrated in its description of historic 
covert operations, events that are kept in deep secrecy become known as 
their details leak out over time, whether through formal or informal 
channels. Most events exist in a gray world of partial secrecy and partial 
disclosure, where even information about events whose existence the 
government denies is available from open sources,304 and where even 
events about which the government has made broad disclosures remain 
somewhat secret and mysterious.305 Government information is not 
subject to control via an on-off switch; instead, it appears incrementally 
over time, both around and in spite of the literal and figurative black 
marks of government efforts to control its spread. 
Third, and as a consequence of the shift from a binary understanding 
of secrecy and disclosure, legal reform should focus on temporal 
commitments to disclosure that force the state to recognize the decreasing 
value of once-secret information and require the state, as a default duty, to 
release documents after a certain interval.306 This would formalize and 
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 305. See supra notes 268–280 and accompanying text. 
 306. See Fenster, Opacity, supra note 28, at 942–45; James A. Goldston et al., A Nation Less 
Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 409, 486 (1986). 
Fenster_21 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:39 PM 
February 2014]       THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF SECRECY 363 
 
hasten a process that is likely to occur in any event. Laws and regulations 
have moved in this direction, albeit with varying degrees of success. These 
include the mandatory declassification of most documents after a certain 
time period under the current Executive Order establishing the 
classification system,307 and the staged release of presidential documents 
under the PRA.308 
The fact that neither commitment has proven entirely successful 
suggests (as ever) the stubborn tendency of the administrative state and 
the constitutional privilege granted to the executive to resist the 
disclosure of information.309 Recall, however, the formal and informal 
means that enable a President and executive branch to control 
information in certain circumstances for a period of time.310 This 
authority, whose logic is entrenched in the Constitution, will not 
disappear. If they are properly implemented and enforced, time-based 
reforms can help compel the regular release of records and force the 
executive branch to recognize disclosure’s inevitability. Law can neither 
perfect secrecy nor cure its excesses, but—working in a manner 
consistent with secrecy’s implausibility and the difficulty of information 
control—it might ameliorate some of its ill effects. 
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